1. Dispute over determination of secured debts under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950 — High Court summary dismissal of petition under Articles 226 and 227. (Para 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 )
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1966 Supreme(SC) 7
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR , C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ.
Ramesh and another, Appellants
Versus
Gendalal Motilal Patni and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 950 of 1965.
Advocates appeared
Mr. C. B. Agarwala, Senior Advocate, (M/s. B. R. L. Iyengar, G. L Sanghi and 1446 A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocates, with him), for Appellants; Mr. M. S. Gupta, Advocate, for Respondent No. 1; Mr. D. R. Prem, Senior Advocate, (Mr. B. R. G. K. Achar, Advocate, with him), for Respondents (Nos. 2 and 3).
Advocates:
A.G.Ratnaparkhi, B.R.G.K.Achar, D.R.Prem, M.S.Gupta
A.G.Ratnaparkhi, B.R.G.K.Achar, D.R.Prem, M.S.Gupta
Article 133 of the Constitution covers 'civil proceedings' in the widest sense, including those under Article 226 affecting civil rights. A summary dismissal of such a petition is a 'final order' if it finally decides the specific controversy (e.g., jurisdiction) raised before the High Court.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 133(1)(a), (b), and (c) - Article 226 and 227 - Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in civil matters - Definition of "civil proceeding" - Whether a petition for a writ under Article 226 constitutes a civil proceeding if the original matter concerned civil rights - Held: The term "civil proceeding" is used in the widest sense and covers all proceedings which affect directly civil rights, in contradistinction to criminal proceedings. (Para 9)
(B) Constitution of India - Article 133 - Scope of "any judgment, decree or final order" - Whether appeals lie against orders passed in the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226 - Held: Article 133 discards the distinction between appellate and original jurisdictions and is wide enough to cover other jurisdictions under which civil rights come before the High Court, including those under Article 226. (Para 10)
(C) Constitution of India - Article 133 - Meaning of "final order" in the context of Article 226 - Whether a summary dismissal of a petition challenging jurisdiction is a final order - Held: A decision in the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction is final if it terminates the special proceeding before the High Court. The finality depends on whether the controversy raised before the High Court is finally over, not whether the entire original controversy is resolved. A summary dismissal upholding the jurisdiction of a tribunal is a final order. (Paras 16, 17)
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose regarding the character of a debt under an abolition act. After various orders by a claims officer and a commissioner, a petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the jurisdiction of the commissioner. The High Court summarily dismissed the petition and subsequently refused to grant a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in refusing the certificate as the matter involved a civil proceeding, the value exceeded the statutory limit, and the summary dismissal constituted a final order regarding the question of jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether the appellants were entitled to a certificate as of right under Article 133(1)(a) or (b) of the Constitution following the summary dismissal of a petition under Article 226.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that "civil proceeding" under Article 133 includes all proceedings affecting civil rights. Furthermore, the article covers orders passed in the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226. An order is "final" for the purpose of Article 133 if it finally decides the specific controversy raised before the High Court, such as the jurisdiction of a tribunal, even if the order is summary in nature.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- constitutional law
- administrative law
-
property law
-
land reform
- abolition of proprietary rights (Para 2)
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land reform
Table of Contents
2. Whether a summary dismissal of a petition under Article 226 constitutes a final order in a civil proceeding entitling the party to a certificate under Article 133. (Para 8 )
3. Proceedings under Article 226 are civil proceedings if they affect civil rights; summary dismissals are final if they terminate the specific controversy raised before the High Court. (Para 9 , 10 , 12 , 15 , 16 )
4. An order under Article 226 is a final order for Article 133 purposes if it finally decides the specific controversy raised before the High Court. (Para 16 , 17 )
5. Appeal allowed — order refusing the certificate under Article 133 set aside — case remanded to the High Court. (Para 18 )
6. Does Article 133 cover proceedings initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution?
Yes. Article 133 covers any judgment, decree, or final order in a civil proceeding. A proceeding under Article 226 is regarded as a civil proceeding if the original proceeding concerned civil rights. (Para 9 , 10 , 12 )
7. Is the right of appeal under Article 133 limited to appellate or ordinary original civil jurisdiction?
No. Article 133 uses wide language to include all judgments, decrees, and final orders, covering not only appellate and ordinary original jurisdictions but also extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226. (Para 10 )
8. What constitutes a final order for the purpose of an appeal under Article 133 in Article 226 proceedings?
An order is final if the specific controversy raised before the High Court is finally decided, regardless of whether the overall underlying dispute between the parties is fully resolved. (Para 16 , 17 )
Judgement
HIDAYATULAH, J. : This is an appeal by special leave against an order dated February 1, 1965 of the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) in Miscellaneous Petition No. 13 of 1965 refusing a certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) or (c) of the Constitution. This certificate was asked by the appellants in respect of the order of the High Court dated September 21, 1964 in Special Civil Application No. 471 of 1964. Both these orders summarily dismissed the respective petitions. Against the main order Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 395 of 1965 has been filed but by an order of this Court dated July 30, 1965, it has been kept pending sine die with liberty to bring it up for hearing after the disposal of the present appeal. This is because the appellants claim in this appeal that appeal lay as of right to this Court and the certificate was wrongly refused by the High Court. Before we discuss the question mooted before us we shall state the facts sufficient for the purpose.
2. On the passing of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals and Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, the appellants applied under S. 19(1) of the Act for the determination of their debts, specifying the amounts and particulars of all secured debts and claims together with the names of the creditors. One such creditor, named by them, is Gendalal Motilal Patni who is the first respondent. His debt was a mortgage debt originally but had resulted in a decree for Rs. 2,16,309. Patni objected that this had ceased to be a secured debt or secured claim for the application of S. 17 (a) of the Abolition Act. The objection was taken under S. 21.
3. The Claims Officer overruled the objection of Patni by an order dated November 19, 1951. He held that although the debt had merged in a decree it remained a secured debt nevertheless and that as the amount was recoverable on the date of vesting, the provisions of the Act were applicable to it. By another order of the same date the Claims Officer called upon Patni to file his statement of claim under S. 22 of the Act. Patni did not file the statement but instead preferred an appeal against the main order before the former Madhya Pradesh Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue held on June 15, 1954 that the Claims Officer had no jurisdiction to determine the character of the debt and only the Civil Court could decide this issue. In reaching this conclusion the Board followed a decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Ramkrishna v. Board of Revenue of M. P., Nagpur , AIR 1954 Nag 248.
4. Patni next moved the Civil Court and the Civil Court decided that the debt in question was a secured debt for the application of the Abolition Act. Patni appealed to the High Court but out of caution filed his statement of claim before Claims Officer on January 23, 1958. The ex-proprietors (the appellants here) objected to the statement on the ground that it was out of time and asked that the claim be held discharged. The Claims Officer accepted the objection and discharged the claim by an order dated December 24, 1962. Patni appealed to the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur (Rev. Appeal No. 2/57/62/63) and by an order of May 5, 1964 the order of the Claims Officer was set aside. The Commissioner pointed out that the decision of the Nagpur High Court earlier referred to was overruled in the subsequent case of the High Court reported in (S) AIR 1956 Nag 193 (FB) and the Claims Officer had jurisdiction to pronounce on the character of the debt. The order of the Claims Officer of November 19, 1951 was thus held to have revived but the claim could not be discharged as action under S. 22 (1) had not been taken. The case was remanded to the claims Officer for disposal according to law.
5. The appellants thereupon filed a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) on the ground that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal and that the Claim
