A composite suit pertaining to lands, which partly fall within the definition in section 2(9) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 and partly lie beyond its ambit, would abate partially under section 4(c) of the Act.

S. S. Sandhawalla, C. J. - Whether a composite suit pertaining to lands, which partly fall within the definition in section 2(9) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation; Act, 1956 and partly lie beyond its ambit, would abate at all; and if so, either wholly or partially under section 4(c) of the said Act, is the somewhat intricate, question necessitating this reference to the Division Bench.

2. Since the primary and, indeed, the sole issue herein is one of abatement, iris unnecessary to delve too deeply into the somewhat tangled facts. The plaintiff appellant, Bettiah Estate, had brought the title suit for eviction of the defendant from the lands measuring 23.16 acres (situated in village Narainpur police station Bagaha, district West Champaran) including the industrial establishment of a saw mill with all its appurtenances of a yard attached thereto as also out houses, store houses and residential quarters for the workmen, etc. It was the case that the said saw mill had been closed down by the State and was advertised for sale and was purchased by Messrs Hari Ram Bholi Ram; However, the said purchasers, instead of removing the saw mill machinery, applied to the Manager of the Bettiah Estate for permission to run the mill and timber business as a lessee, which proposal was submitted for sanction to the Commissioner, Tirhut Division, which was later accorded. However, the purchasers failed to execute and register a deed of lease as had been agreed to despite repeated demands and consequently Title Suit no. 98 of 1955 against the said purchasers for their ejectment came to be filed by the appellant. During the pendency of the said suit, the defendant Nand Kishore Prasad applied to the Manager of the Bettiah Estate for purchasing the saw mill from the former purchasers. The plaintiff appellant agreed to allow the defendant to run saw mill on the condition that he would later execute and register deed of lease on the same terms and conditions as in the unregistered deed of lease of Messrs Hari Ram Bholi Ram. On the basis of the agreement, a satisfaction petition was filed in the aforesaid Title Suit no. 98 of 1955.

3. The defendant, in pursuance of the above agreement, was allowed to occupy the disputed land and buildings but later on he also failed to execute and register a lease and the claim, therefore, was that his possession was that of a tenant at will or a mere licensee. It was further alleged that the defendant had committed various acts of negligence and default and was liable for damages. After serving notice the suit for eviction and for damages far use and occupation-both past and future-was instituted.

4. The defendant contested the suit by filing two written statements and controverting the allegations of the appellant. It defence, it was claimed that the defendant was in possession as a raiyat and had become a full-fledged occupancy raiyat without the execution of any registered lease and that he was not tenant at will or a licensee. It was further alleged that Murat Ahir and others had deen in occupation of about 9 acres of land and they had built their residential houses thereon. Further, there was a foot-ball ground on 3 acres of land and, the defendant continued to be in possession of the remaining area which he cultivates.

5. On the aforesaid pleading, as many as 9 issues were framed, and on holding most of them in favour of, the plaintiff appellant the trial court decreed the suit concluding that the defendant was a tenant at will of the disputed land and buildings and directed the ejectment of the defendant as also the payment of Rs. 2,371/40 paise as damages. On appeal, the learned District Judge noticed that the only point which had been pressed before him was whether the defendant appellant, who was a tenant at will or licensee, could be evicted by the plaintiff. On a consideration of the facts, and circumstances, the first appellate court came to the conclusion that t