The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for reasonable exercise of power by the Collector and the principle of undue delay in challenging transactions under the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956.

Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

These Intra Court Appeals arise under identical situations and having been heard together are being disposed of by this common order.

2. This is a strange case wherein the bonafide purchaser for value of agricultural land is sought to be deprived of his purchased land at the instance of grand son of the vendor after 23 years of the registered sale deed not because of any dispute of right, title and interest but taking advantage of mere technicalities in law.

3. The appellant was the writ petitioner. She was aggrieved by the order of the Collector, Buxar, dated 22.07.2009 by which he imposed a fine of Rs.250/- on the writ petitioner-appellant being the vendee under Section 32 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), while holding that the registered sale deed dated 01.08.1983 executed by Ram Briksh Singh, the grand father of the private respondent, Pramod Kumar Singh was void being without permission of the Consolidation Officer as required under Section 5 of the Act.

4. The private respondent has also appeared and has been heard. We asked the private respondent whether he challenges the right, title, interest or other authority of his grand father to sell the land to the writ petitioner-appellant. He admitted that, that was not in dispute. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant drawn our attention to the application filed by the private respondent before the Collector, Buxar, calling upon to declare the registered sale deed executed by the grand father to be void under Section 32 of the Act. The only ground for that was that the sale deed had been executed and registered before consolidation proceeding could be denotified upon finalization under Section 26A of the Act. How the private respondent could be effected and what was his locus to challenge the registered sale deed executed by his grand father was not disclosed? Upon notice, the writ petitioner-appellant appeared and filed before the Collector documents to show that the consolidation operations in the village for all practical purposes had concluded with the finalization of the Draft Consolidation Scheme under Section 13 of the Act in the year 1981 itself, almost two years prior to the execution of the sale deed. The sale deed itself was in terms of the new Chak that was allotted which had been finalized. This is not being disputed. Merely because the notification under Section 26A of the Act, has not yet been issued by the State of Bihar, even after 25 years of conclusion of the proceedings, the sale deed should not be interfered with. The Collector wrongly holding that the confirmation of chak and finalization of the consolidation proceedings took place in 1991, whereas the sale deed is of 1983, declared it to be void under Section 32 of the Act and went on to impose a fine of Rs.250/- upon the writ petitioner-appellant, who was the vendee and not upon the grand father of the applicant, who was the land holder. In our view, case calls for interference.

5. Before proceeding further, we may notice that the learned Single Judge, relying upon the several decisions, held the sale deed executed without permission of the authorities to be void. When the appeal was taken up, reliance was placed by the appellant on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Raji Sharma & Anr. V. The State of Bihar & Ors., since reported in 2007(4) PLJR 449, the correctness whereof was doubted by the Division Bench during the hearing of the appeal and it was referred to the Full Bench. The Division Bench in Ram Raji Sharma (supra) held that Section 32 of the Act speaks about the transaction being void in respect of which no permission was taken from the consolidation authority. The voidness was in relation to the consolidation proceedings alone. In other words, the Division Bench was of the view that such transaction was not vo