The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of the nature and legal effect of a final adjudicatory order in a proceeding for grant of probate or letters of administration under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, and the classification of appeals filed under the Act.

KISHORE KUMAR MANDAL, J.

1. The order on the reference of the learned single judge.

2. The irksome issue pertaining to the classification of the appeals filed before this Court under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act (for short ‘the Act’) and under section 384(2) of the Act has been placed for determination upon reference expressing doubts over the decision by a learned single judge in Most. Kewala Devi Vs. Smt. Krishna Devi, 2013 (1) PLJR 176.

3. The reasons for making the reference has been mentioned, in detail, in the order dated 03.11.2015, and the authoritative pronouncements by the Apex Court and other courts have also been elaborately taken into notice which require no repetition in this order. Suffice it to state that some of the appeals have been filed under Section 299 of the Act as First Appeals against the order of grant or refusal of probate or letters of administration and some of the appeals have been filed under Section 384 (2) of the Act against the order of grant or refusal of succession certificate.

4. The main plank of submissions of Mr. Trivedi, learned senior counsel for the appellant in F.A. No. 633 of 1998 and M.A. No. 504 of 1998 is based upon the proposition that in view of the use of the word ‘order’ in Section 299 of the Act, an appeal filed against such ‘order’ would be governed by Section 104 of C.P.C. providing for an appeal against an order passed in the suit and would be further regulated by the procedure prescribed therefor. Pyramiding his contentions, learned senior counsel has relied upon general rules of statutory interpretations frowning upon import of external aid for providing meaning to unambiguous words or provisions in a statute. Placing decisions galore, it has been propounded that an order passed in a proceeding for grant of probate or letters of administration of a Will or a proceeding for grant of succession certificate shall be subject to the procedure envisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure for an appeal against an order. Lastly, it has also been submitted that the Constitution Bench decision in P.S. Sathappan vs. Andhra Bank Ltd., A.I.R. 2004 SC 5152 has settled the controversy finally holding that an appeal against the orders in controversy at present would be an appeal under Section 104 C.P.C. Learned senior counsel, in addition, has also referred to the provisions in part-X of the Indian Succession Act for contending that an order passed in a proceeding for grant of succession certificate has also been declared conclusive but according to the practice and procedure of this Court, a Misc. Appeal is filed and entertained against such an order.

5. Mr. Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents in F.A. No. 633 of 1998 and M.A. No. 508 of 1998, however, has taken an entirely different stand by coming out with the proposition that taking a literal meaning of the word ‘order’ in a statutory provision would not be only a determinative factor, and the context in which certain order has been passed and its effect on the rights and liabilities of the parties in the proceeding have to be given primacy. It has been propounded that an adjudication in a proceeding shall be a ‘decree’ if the statute so provides directly or by deeming fiction but there is another classification also where such adjudication has been conferred the status of a decree under certain circumstances, by authoritative pronouncements. It has been argued that in a proceeding for grant of probate or letters of administration there is definitely a final adjudication on the rights and liabilities of the parties and an order under Section 299 of the Indian Succession act will have to be given the status of a ‘decree’ and an appeal against such order will be regulated by the procedure prescribed for an appeal against a decree. Making a frontal attack on the submissions on behalf of the appellants in first two appeals regarding statutory conclusiveness of the order passed in a proceeding for gran