ORDER

Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the opposite parties.

2. All these revision applications have been filed against the different Awards, passed by the Bihar Public Works Contract Disputes Arbitration Tribunal in different Reference Cases, alongwith the interlocutory applications for condonation of dealy.

3. At the time of consideration of the limitation petition the opposite party raised preliminary objection with regard to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Learned counsel for the opposite party submits that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceedings under Section 13 of Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008 (the Act of 2008) has been excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of language employed in Section 17 of the said Act.

4. This Court has considered Section 17 of the Act of the 2008, which reads as follows: –

“In computing the period of limitation laid down in sub-section (1) of Section 8, and sub-section (2) of Section 11 and sub-section (1) of Section 12, the provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall, so far as may be, apply.”

5. Mr. Rajendra Narayan, learned Senior counsel for the opposite party submits that the Arbitration Act means the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as prescribed in Section 2 of the said Act. The question of applicability of the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceeding under Section 34 Clause 3 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is further submitted that the Act of 2008 shall follow the principle of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The provisions contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 came up for consideration. The relevant provisions contained in Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is extracted, which is as follows: –

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award: –

(3). An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

6. Learned Senior counsel for the opposite party has further submitted that proviso to Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 merely provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its discretion that would not have been sufficient to exclude Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. However, expression in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 “but not thereafter” would amount to express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded in the aforesaid expression.

7. The question involved while exercising revisional power under Section 13 of the Act of 2008 contained the delay in case as the revision is under Section 13 of the Act of 2008 if filed beyond 90 days from the date on which the Award or interim Award is made or reviewed under this Act or it excludes the applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and inconsequent of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

8. The provisions contained in Section 13 of the Act of 2008 relating to the revisional power of the High Court reads as under: –

“(1) The High Court may, suo moto at any time or on an application made to it within three months from the date on which the award or interim award is made or reviewed under this Act, by any party aggrieved by the award or interim award so made or reviewed, call for the record of