SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2025 Supreme(Pat) 1453

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
MOHIT KUMAR SHAH and SONI SHRIVASTAVA, JJ.
Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1380 of 2025
(26.11.2025)
Shatrughan Yadav @ Satrughan Yadav & Anr. ... Appellant
vs.
State of Bihar & Anr. ... Respondents

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellants : M/s Gagandeo Yadav, Udeshya Kumar Yadav, Ravi Prakash.
For the State : M/s Binod Bihari Singh, APP Amicus Curiae, Surya Nilambari.

Headnote:

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 235 and 354 and 386(b) – Sentence – Section 235 Cr.P.C. mandates that in case accused is convicted, convict has to be heard on question of sentence and then order of sentence has to be passed by Trial Judge in accordance with law – If conclusion of trial in a criminal prosecution ends in conviction, then Judgment is considered to be complete in all respects only when sentence is imposed on convict, if convict is not given benefit of Section 360 Cr.P.C. – It is mandatory that judgment of conviction is followed by appropriate order of sentence – Awarding of sentence in a criminal case is not a mere formality – Where penal provision instead of rigidly fixing duration of term of imprisonment, prescribes maximum and minimum limit, Trial Court, while passing order of sentence, has to exercise its discretion taking into consideration germane factors and fix exact length of term of imprisonment by quantifying term of imprisonment and not leaving sentence indeterminate, unspecified as also vague which is a fatal vice – In such cases where Trial Court omits to quantify term of imprisonment, same would render such order of sentence illegal and not irregular. (Paras 12 and 13)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Section 10/17 read with Section 17 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 376 (2) (n) – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 235, 354 and 386 (b) – Rape of minor girl – Trial Judge has not exercised his discretion and left sentence indeterminate, unspecified as also vague which is a fatal vice and amounts to depriving liberty of convict which can only be deprived in accordance with procedure established by law and by court of competent jurisdiction – Such illegality which cannot be cured by High Court – Matter remanded back to Trial Court with direction to pass appropriate order of sentence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 read with Section 5(l) of POCSO Act, 2012, after giving opportunity of hearing to convict – Impugned judgment of conviction would stand as it is qua appellants. (Paras 16 to 19)

Mohit Kumar Shah, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned APP for the State and the learned Amicus Curiae, Ms. Surya Nilambari, Advocate.

2. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.09.2025, passed by the learned Court of Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO Act), Darbhanga in POCSO G.R. Case No.47 of 2016 (arising out of Bishanpur (Darbhanga) P.S. Case No.86 of 2016), whereby and whereunder while the appellant no. 1 Shatrughan Yadav @ Satrughan Yadav has been convicted under Section 10/17 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “the POCSO Act, 2012”) read with Section 17 of the POCSO Act, 2012, the appellant no. 2, namely Anil Yadav has been convicted under Section 376 (2) (n) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”) and under Section 6 read with Section 5(l) and Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

3. By the order of sentence dated 09.09.2025, passed by the Ld. Court of Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO Act), Darbhanga, the appellant no. 1 Shatrughan Yadav @ Satrughan Yadav has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for a term of seven years U/s. 10/17 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with Section 17 of the POCSO Act, 2012 with fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of the same, he has been directed to further undergo simple imprisonment (SI) for six months. As far as the appellant no. 2, namely Anil Yadav is concerned, he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC with a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default to pay the same, he has been further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The appellant no. 2, namely Anil Yadav also been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years under Section 6 read with Section 5(1) of the POCSO Act, 2012 with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of the same, he has been further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for six months apart from the appellant no.2 having also been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 7 years under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of the same, he has been further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for six months.

4. The issue which has arisen in the present case is with regard to the sentence awarded by the learned Court of Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO Act), Darbhanga qua the appellant no. 2, namely Anil Yadav. We find from the impugned order of sentence dated 09.09.2025 that the appellant no.2 has been sentenced to undergo RI for a term which shall not be less than 10 years U/s. 6 R/w. Section 5(1) of the POCSO Act, 2012 as it stood prior to amendment of the year 2019 with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of the same, he has been further directed to undergo SI for six months and similarly, he has also been sentenced to undergo RI for a term which shall not be less than 10 years U/s. 376(2)(n) of the IPC with a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default to pay the same, he has been further directed to undergo SI for six months. However, we find from the pre-amended provision contained in Section 6(1) of the POCSO Act, 2012 that the sentence prescribed thereunder is “rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine” and more or less, similar sentence is provided for in Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC except that imprisonment for life has been explained to mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life. Thus, apparently the sentence awarded to the appellant no. 2 has not been quantified in accordance with the provisions contained under Section 6(l) of the POCSO Act, 2012 and under Section 376(2) (n) of the IPC. In such view of the matter, we had appoi

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top