The tenant is required to deposit the arrears of rent for the period for which he may have made default including the time barred arrears under the provisions of S.17 (1) read with (2) of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

BANERJEE, J. :- This revisional application was heard as contested application in presence of both the parties. The point involved in this revisional application is whether in adjudicating an application under S.17(2) of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act the Court is to take cognizance of arrears which are time barred or not. On the point there was an earlier Division Bench decision reported in (1961) 65 Cal WN 1093 (Raghu Nath Singh v. Patel and Co.). In a case reported in AIR 1978 SC 287 (Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ramchandra) it was held by the Supreme Court that while considering a provision of S.20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, the Supreme Court held that the words entire amount due as contained in S.20(4) of the Act included rent which has become time barred. Following the said decision the Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in (1980) 1 Cal LJ 80 : (AIR 1980 Cal 114) (Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindra Nath Dutta) held, inter alia, that the case reported in (1961) 65 Cal WN 1093 (Raghu Nath Singh v. Patel and Co.) was not properly decided and in any case has been overruled by the Supreme Court judgment as hereinbefore stated. After the judgment was delivered by the Division Bench, however, the Honble single Judge in a case reported in (1981) 85 Cal WN 840 : (AIR 1981 Cal 352) (L.N. Shah V. D.P. Karmakar) at page 846 (of Cal WN) : (at p.356 of AIR) held that the Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable and the Supreme Court has not by implication overruled the decision of our High Court reported in (1961) 65 Cal WN 1093. When the same matter came up before the Division Bench, the Division Bench referred the matter to the learned Chief Justice for constitution of a Special Bench for hearing of the present revisional application. The Honble Chief Justice having constituted the Bench, the matter was placed before us for hearing.

2. Mr. S.N. Bakshi on behalf of the petitioner contended firstly that in S.17 of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act there are no restrictions for the period of default in the four corners of the said section, secondly, he argued that S.17 was enacted to give the benefit to the tenant on condition that if the tenant wants to avoid striking out his defence against delivery of possession he must have to deposit the amount specified under section or if there is a dispute of the amount under S.17 (2) of the Act may raise it by an application under S.17 (2) of the Act. It is argued by Mr. Bakshi that limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt which still remains in force and if payable the creditor or in this case landlord may recover the debt in some other way. The bar of limitation only extinguishes the remedy by way of suit but the debt still remains due.

3. Mr. Tarun Chatterjee on behalf of the opposite party, however, contended that S.17 is not only for the benefit of the tenant but also for the landlord. Mr. Chatterjee contended that the decision reported in AIR 1978 SC 287 (Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ramchandra) has no manner of application in the present case as the provision of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act is quite different from S.20 (4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, which was interpreted by the Supreme Court in AIR 1978 SC 287. It is argued by Mr. Chatterjee that the Division Bench judgment reported in (1980) 1 Cal LJ 80 : (AIR 1980 Cal 114) (Central Coalfields Ltd v. Rabindra Nath Dutta) is not correct, inasmuch as, their Lordships of the Division Bench could not import the word "entire" into the body of S.17 as the said section does not contain the word. Mr. Chatterjee further contended the Honble single Judge in the case reported in (1981) 85 Cal WN 840 : (AIR 1981 Cal 352) (L.N. Saha v. D.P. Karmakar) was of the opinion and rightly so that the judgment of (1980) 1 Cal LJ 80 : (AIR 1980 Cal 114) does not deal with S.17 (2) at all. It only deals with S