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HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
S. C. GHOSH, SALIL KUMAR DATTA, A. K. JANAH
SK. BAFATULLA MUKHTEAR - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF WEST BENGAL - Respondent
. 559 (W) Of 1968
Decided On : DECEMBER 15, 1972
The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted to abolish the zamindari system and acquire all estates and rights of intermediaries therein. Section 5-A of the Act was inserted by an amendment in 1954 to empower the State Government to enquire into any transfer of land made during a specified period, if there were prima facie reasons to believe that such transfer was not bona fide and was made with a view to defeating the purposes of the Act. The validity of Section 5-A was challenged on various grounds, including that it violated the constitutional principles of separation of powers, judicial independence, and excessive delegation of power. The Court held that Section 5-A did not violate the principle of separation of powers as the power conferred on the State Government under the section was not a judicial power but an executive power involving quasi-judicial functions. The Court also held that the delegation of power to revenue officers under Sub-section (4) of Section 5-A was valid and did not violate Article 154(2)(b) of the Constitution. The Court further held that the provisions of Section 5-A were integral to the Act and were protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution, which protected laws enacted for the acquisition of estates and rights therein. The Court also held that the provisions of Section 5-A did not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution as they were saved by the combined effect of Articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution.
Fact of the Case:
The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of 1954) was enacted to abolish the zamindari system and acquire all estates and rights of intermediaries therein. Section 5-A of the Act was inserted by an amendment in 1954 to empower the State Government to enquire into any transfer of land made during a specified period, if there were prima facie reasons to believe that such transfer was not bona fide and was made with a view to defeating the purposes of the Act. The validity of Section 5-A was challenged on various grounds, including that it violated the constitutional principles of separation of powers, judicial independence, and excessive delegation of power.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that Section 5-A did not violate the principle of separation of powers as the power conferred on the State Government under the section was not a judicial power but an executive power involving quasi-judicial functions. The Court also held that the delegation of power to revenue officers under Sub-section (4) of Section 5-A was valid and did not violate Article 154(2)(b) of the Constitution. The Court further held that the provisions of Section 5-A were integral to the Act and were protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution, which protected laws enacted for the acquisition of estates and rights therein. The Court also held that the provisions of Section 5-A did not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution as they were saved by the combined effect of Articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution.
Issues: 1. Whether Section 5-A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 violated the principle of separation of powers? 2. Whether the delegation of power to revenue officers under Sub-section (4) of Section 5-A was valid? 3. Whether the provisions of Section 5-A were integral to the Act and were protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution? 4. Whether the provisions of Section 5-A violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The power conferred on the State Government under Section 5-A was not a judicial power but an executive power involving quasi-judicial functions. 2. The delegation of power to revenue officers under Sub-section (4) of Section 5-A was valid and did not violate Article 154(2)(b) of the Constitution. 3. The provisions of Section 5-A were integral to the Act and were protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution, which protected laws enacted for the acquisition of estates and rights therein. 4. The provisions of Section 5-A did not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution as they were saved by the combined effect of Articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution.
Final Decision: The Court held that Section 5-A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 was valid and did not violate the constitutional principles of separation of powers, judicial independence, and excessive delegation of power. The Court also held that the provisions of Section 5-A were integral to the Act and were protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. The Court further held that the provisions of Section 5-A did not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution as they were saved by the combined effect of Articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution.
( 1 ) THESE rules, arising under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, have been referred by the Chief Justice to the Special Division Bench as at present constituted for disposal, under Rule 1 (ii), Chapter II of the Appellate Side Rules, primarily on the requisition of a Division Bench for considering inter alia the vires of Section 5-A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of 1954 ).
( 2 ) MR. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners in C. R. Nos. 2190-93 of 1961, submitted, as the hearing commenced, that the present reference to the Special Bench was not a proper reference, as the Bench hearing these rules had taken a view different from the view taken earlier by Division Bench in Ambujakhya Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, TLR (1966) 1 Cal 495 and accordingly the reference should have been made to a Full Bench. He referred to the decision in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal, in which it was observed:"if one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. . . . . . . . . . If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the result would be utter confusion. . . . . . . . . . It is the uniform practice in all High Courts in India that if one Division Bench differs from an earlier view on a question of law of another Division Bench, a reference is made to a larger Bench. In Calcutta High Court a rule to this effect has been in existence since 1867. . . . . . . . . . . . . ". The same view was taken in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey.
( 3 ) RULES of the High Court at Calcutta, Appellate Side, inter alia provided in Chapter VII, Rule 1 that whenever one Division Bench shall differ from another Division Bench upon a point of law or usage having the force of law, the case shall be referred for decision by a Full Bench, unless the point has been decided by a pre-Constitution decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or of the Federal Court of India or of the Supreme Court of India. If therefore, the Division Bench, which heard the rules DOW before us, differed on a point of law or usage having the force of law from the decision of the Division Bench which decided Ambujakhya's case, ILR (1966) 1 Cal 495, it was incumbent on the latter Bench to refer the matters before it to a Full Bench for decision. It would however appear that the said Division Bench did not differ either expressly or impliedly from the earlier decision referred to above. Certain aspects on the points at issue were urged at the hearing of these rules which were not placed before the earlier Division Bench, including a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. As the points raised are of constitutional importance involving also interpretation of a "troublesome" section of the Act, the Bench itself exercised its power under Chapter II R. 1 (ii) of the said Rules, which inter alia provide as follows:--". . . . . on the requisition of any Division Bench, or whenever he thinks fit the Chief Justice may appoint a Special Division Bench, to consist of three or more Judges, for hearing of any particular appeal or any particular question of law arising in an appeal, or of any other matter. "as we have noted above there was no difference of view between the two Division Benches on any point of law or usage having force of law, but in view of the contentions since raised, which in that form were not raised in the earlier Bench, the referring Bench felt on account of the constitutional importance of the question, that the matter should be reconsidered by a Special Division Bench and reference was made accordingly. Occasion for reference to a Full Bench accordingly did not arise in the circumstances.
( 4 ) MR. Banerjee next argued that even so the present Special
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