An erroneous advice of counsel may constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but the applicant must establish that the advice was given by a skilled or competent person, that the lawyer who gave the opinion exercised reasonable care, and that the view taken by the lawyer was not such as would have been entertained by a competent person exercising reasonable skill.

( 1 ) THIS is an election petition in respect of the Dubrajpur Constituency in the District of Birbhum. The petitioner was a candidate in this constituency in the last General Election and had lost to the respondent No. 1 by a margin of 290 votes. The Returning Officer declared the result of the election on the 23rd February 1967. The petitioner wanted to present his election petition on the 17th April, 1967. There were doubts in my mind as to whether the petitioner came to this Court within time. The petitioner's Counsel then submitted to me that he did not want to take the risk; and would make an application for condonation of the delay, if any, in presenting the petition. Accordingly, an application for condonation, if necessary, has beep made.

( 2 ) FOR the last two days I have heard arguments of the petitioner's counsel, the Advocate General (who is appearing for the District Election Officer and the Returning Officer, the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 herein) and counsel for the respondent No. 1. This morning I was told by the petitioner's counsel that he did not wish to press the application for condonation of delay and was desirous of having my decision on the merits of the point raised by him, namely, that the petition was within time. I, accordingly, gave direction that there would be no order on the application for condonation of delay and no order as to costs of that application as well. I was proceeding to express my views on the principal point of the petitioner's counsel that the petition was not barred by limitation. At this stage the petitioner himself intervened. He said to me that his Counsel had withdrawn the application for condonation of delay without his instructions. He asked for my leave to discharge all his Advocates and submitted to me that he should be given permission to argue his case in person on condonation of delay. For ends of justice I have heard his arguments appearing in person. I would now express my views both on the merits and on the issue of condonation.

( 3 ) THE petitioner's counsel first drew my attention to Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The relevant provisions of this Section are as follows :--"an election petition calling in question any election may be presented. . . . by any candidate at such election. . . within 45 days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candidate. . . "

( 4 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner contends that the starting point of limitation is tile date of election of the returned candidate. The emphasis, he says, is on the word "returned" and we have to look to Section 79 (f) of the Act for the definition of a "returned candidate". The definition is that a "returned candidate" means a candidate whose name has been published under Section 67 as duly elected.

( 5 ) NOW, Section 67 provides as follows:--"as soon as may be after the result of an election has been declared, the Returning Officer shall report the result to the appropriate authority and the Election Commission and in the case of an election to a House of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State also to the Secretary of that House, and the appropriate authority shall cause to be published in the Official Gazette the declarations containing the names of the elected candidates. "

( 6 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner's counsel, limitation for presenting an Election Petition starts running from the date of publication in terms of Section 67 and the Election Petition in the instant case has been presented within 45 days of that date

( 7 ) I am unable to accept this contention. If we substitute the definition of a "returned candidate" in Section 81 itself, the result is that the Election Petition is to be presented within 45 days from the date of election of the "candidate whose name has been published under Section 67 as duly elected". It is manifest that the date of the election may not be the same as the date of publication. If we now turn t