Judgment

AYYANGAR, J.: (For B. P. Sinha C.J.I. and himself)-

We have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of our brother Subba Rao, J. and we agree with him that the appeal should be dismissed.

2. The justification for this separate judgment, however, is because of our inability to agree with him in his construction of the relative scope of the two limbs of S. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act.

3. The facts of the case have been set out in detail in the judgment of Subba Rao, J. and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat them. There were three principal points that were urged before us on either side which require to be considered and all of them turn on the proper construction of S. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act which we shall for convenience set out here :

"29. (2) where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law -

(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and

(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply."

4. The learned Judges of the High Court have proceeded on the basis that S. 29(2) (a) applies to the case of appeals preferred under S. 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and on that footing have held that the appeal presented to them by the respondent was within time if computed after making the deductions permitted by S. 12 of the Limitation Act. It is the correctness of this view that is challenged before us.

5. Proceeding now to deal with the question whether the terms of S. 29(2) are apt to take in appeals under the representation of the People Act, the first matter to be considered necessarily is whether that Act is a "Special or Local law" within the opening words of the sub-section. As to this however Mr. Pathak raised no dispute and he conceded that S 116A was such a "special or local law". That this "special or local law" prescribes "for an appeal a period of limitation" is also evident. The first point of controversy, hwoever, has arisen as to whether "the period of limitation precribed by the special or Local Law is different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule." The contention urged strenously before us by Mr. Pathak, the learned Counsel for the appellant was that there would be "a different period" only where for the identical appeal (to refer only to that proceeding with which we are immediately concerned) for which a period of limitation has been prescribed by the Special or Local Law, a period is prescribed by first column of the 1st Schedule, and there is a difference between the two periods. It was his further contention that where the Indian Limitation Act made no provision for such an appeal, S. 29(2) and the provision contained in its (a) and (b) were inapplicable. There have been several decisions on this point but it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Canara Bank Ltd., Bombay v. Warden Insurance Co. Ltd., Bombay, ILR (1952) Bom. 1083: where Chagla, C. J., repelled this construction and held that even where there was no provistion in the 1st Schedule for an appeal in situation identical with that for which the Special Law provides, the test of "a prescription of a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule is satisfied. This Court in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, Cri. Appeal No. 126 of 1962, D/- 20-9-1963: upheld this construction and approved the judgment of Chagla, C. J., in the Canara Bank case, ILR (1952) Bom 1083. Apart from the decision of this Court, we consider the reas