( 1 ) HAS this Court jurisdiction to vary an order, passed by consent, and relieve the appellant petitioner from the mischief of a default clause in an order made by this Court ? This is the question which we need answer in this matter.

( 2 ) IN Civil Rule No. 227 (m) of 1961, arising out of F. M. A. No. 77 of 1961, there was an order of injunction passed by this Court, restraining the State of Bihar from proceeding with Title Suit No. 45 of 1960, pending in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, at Hazaribagh, and from acting in violation of the terms of a previous compromise, on conditions hereinafter appearing:"by consent of parties, this Rule is made absolute and the injunction will continue till the disposal of the appeal on the following conditions; (1) The appellant company shall deposit in the Hazaribagh Subordinate Judge's Court, in title Suit No. 45 of 1960, Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand) only by the 10th May, 1962 and shall also go on depositing Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand) only by the 10th day of each succeeding month until disposal of the appeal, now pending in this Court, (2) In default of payment of any of the instalments as aforesaid, the Rule shall stand discharged and the injunction order will stand vacated, (3) There will be no order as to costs. The above arrangement is without prejudice to the claims and contentions of the parties In the above mentioned suit No. 45 of 1960 of the Subordinate Judge's Court at Hazaribagh". The above order was passed on April 9, 1962.

( 3 ) THE appellant petitioner deposited the sum of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand) within the time allowed by the consent order, and thereafter also deposited several sums of Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand) per month, within the time fixed by the said order. Between February 1963 to November, 1963, however, the appellant petitioner did not deposit the sum of Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand) per month, within the time fixed by the consent order, namely, in the months of February, March, June, July, August, September, October and November, 1963. The reason why the appellant petitioner could not put in the money, in terms of the consent order, was that due to temporary paucity of funds, occasioned by non-realisation of outstanding claims, the payment could not be made in lime.

( 4 ) BY not depositing the money, in terms of the consent order, the appellant petitioner invited the mischief of Clause (2) of the consent order above quoted. It is in these circumstances, that the appellant petitioner applied before this Court, on February 12, 1964, praying: (1) that the delay in making the deposits be condoned, or (2) that the order, dated April 9, 1962, be modified by substituting the words "last Jay of each succeeding month" for the words "10th day of succeeding month" in Clause (1) of the consent order, or (3) that a fresh Rule with an interim injunction be issued calling upon the State of Bihar to show cause why it should not be restrained from proceeding with Title Suit No. 45 of 1960 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Hazaribagh pending the disposal of the appeal before this Court.

( 5 ) BY consent of the State of Bihar, the application was directed to be heard as a contested Application, without issuing a formal rule nisi.

( 6 ) MR. P. N. Mitter, learned Advocate for the appellant petitioner, strongly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahanth Ramdas v. Gangadas, in which Hidayatullah, J. , speaking for the Court, made the following observations:"the application for extension of time was made before the time fixed by the High Court for payment of deficit court-fee had actually run out That application appears not to have been considered at all, in view of the peremptory order which had been passed earlier by the Division Bench hearing the appeal, mainly because on the date of the hearing of the petition for extension of time, the period had expired. The short question is Whether the High Court, in the circums

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