1963 Supreme(Cal) 42
HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
P. N. MUKHERJEE, K. C. SEN
ASWINI KUMAR PAN - Appellant
Versus
PARIMAL DEBI - Respondent
A. F. A. D. 1536 Of 1958
Decided On : MARCH 4, 1963
Jnanendra Mohan, Pankaj Coomar Ghosh, S.C.JANAH
A child en ventre sa mere is deemed to be in existence for purposes of inheritance and thus has a right to challenge any transaction affecting its interest. Therefore, such a child must be considered a minor and entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, which extends the limitation period for minors.
Headnote:
LIMITATION ACT - SECTION 6 - APPLICABILITY TO CHILD EN VENTRE SA MERE - CHILD IN MOTHER'S WOMB DEEMED IN EXISTENCE FOR INHERITANCE PURPOSES - MINORITY STATUS - EXTENSION OF LIMITATION PERIOD.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff, born posthumously, challenged the validity of a Kobala (deed of sale) obtained from his mother by the defendant, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and lack of legal necessity. The trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, but the appellate court dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, which extends the limitation period for minors, applied to him as he was in his mother's womb when the Kobala was executed.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act applied to the plaintiff, as a child in the mother's womb is deemed to be in existence for purposes of inheritance and thus has a right to challenge any transaction affecting its interest. Since the plaintiff was a minor at the time his cause of action arose, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 6, which extended the limitation period to three years after the cessation of his disability.
Issues: 1. Whether Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to a child en ventre sa mere. 2. Whether the plaintiff was a minor at the time his cause of action arose. 3. Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act in light of the Indian Majority Act, which defines a minor as a person who has not attained the age of majority. The court reasoned that a child in the mother's womb is deemed to be in existence for purposes of inheritance and thus has a right to challenge any transaction affecting its interest. Therefore, such a child must be considered a minor and entitled to the benefit of Section 6, which extends the limitation period for minors. 2. The court found that the plaintiff was a minor at the time his cause of action arose, as he was in his mother's womb when the Kobala was executed. 3. The court concluded that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation, as Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act extended the limitation period to three years after the cessation of his disability.
Final Decision: The court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate court, and restored the decree of the trial court, subject to the modification that the plaintiff would be entitled to mesne profits only from three years before the suit.
( 1 ) THIS appeal raises an interesting question, a question which has not arisen and has not been considered by this Court, strictly speaking, in any of the cases, which have been brought to our notice. There are, however, decisions of other High Courts on this particular point but they are conflicting and that gives an added interest to the said point before us.
( 2 ) THE suit was brought, on February 18, 1952, by the present appellant for declaration of his title to the suit-lands and recovery of possession of the same from the defendants, or, in the alternative, for cancellation and setting aside of a certain Kobala (Deed of Sale), obtained from his mother by the defendant No. 1, with the consequential relief of possession. Upon the above reliefs, further relief in the shape of mesne profits was also prayed for. The suit was contested by the defendants. The learned trial Judge decreed the suit but, on appeal, it was dismissed, primarily, on the ground of limitation and It is this point of limitation, which is the real and stubbornly contested point before us.
( 3 ) THE facts, giving rise to the present litigation, lie within a short compass and they may be stated as follows: The suit lands belonged to the plaintiff's father Bibhuti Bhusan Pan, who died in Ashar 1340 B. S. , leaving him surviving his widow pro forma defendant No. 9, who was pregnant at the time, and eventually, gave brith to the present plaintiff, as a poshumous child, on 10th Aswin 1340 B. S. During the interval, however, that is, in Bhadra 1340 B. S. , several fraudulent and collusive documents were obtained by the defendants from the plaintiffs mother, including a Kobala, dated 9th Bhadra 1340 B. S. , in favour of defendant No. 1 in respect of the present suit tends, and they went into possession of the said lands on the basis of the same. The plaintiff attained majority on 10th Aswin 1358 B. S. and, on the 26th following, he demanded back possession from the defendants and, upon their refusal, brought the instant suit on 18th February 1952.
( 4 ) IN the plaint, various allegations were made against the above Kobala, on which, primarily, the defendants rested their claim of title. It was alleged by the plaintiff that there was no legal necessity for the same, that the said Kobala was vitiated by fraud and mis-representation and, further; that it was without
consideration.
( 5 ) THE defence was a denial of the plaintiff's above allegations, namely, that there was any defect in the Kobala in question, as. alleged by the plaintiff, and a specific assertion that it was a Kobala for legal necessity, that it was also for full and adequate consideration and that it was not affected by any mis-representation or fraud or by any infirmity whatsoever. It was further alleged that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation although there was no dispute that the plaintiff was in his mother's womb at the time, when the disputed Kobala came into existence, and that he was actually born on 10th Aswin 1340 B. S. , as alleged by him.
( 6 ) ON the question of legal necessity, both the Courts below have concurrently found against the defendants and that point is thus concluded by the said concurrent finding of fact of the two Courts below against the present respondents.
( 7 ) ON the question of consideration also, both the Courts badow have agreed that there was consideration for the Kobala in question, although, according to the trial Courts view, the consideration was not adequate. That, however, would not, by itself, be a ground for avoidance of the disputed Kobala, and, in any event, the lower appellate Court's finding that the consideration was adequate must be taken as final.
( 8 ) ON the question of fraud and mis-representation, at least the Court of appeal below, as the final Court of fact, has found against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants, and, in this second appeal, that finding has to be accented.
( 9 ) ON the point of