A person employed in a supervisory capacity and drawing wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per month, or exercising functions mainly of a managerial nature, is not a 'workman' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act.

( 1 ) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner is Mcleod and Co, Ltd. The respondents are the Sixth Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal and the discharged employee K. P. Sanyal. The object of complaint is the award made by such Industrial Tribunal dated the 18th June, 1957, whereby Respondent K. P. Sanyal was held to be a clerk and workman of the petitioner. The Tribunal held that the termination of Sanyal's services without permission of the Tribunal was a clear contravention of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore directed reinstatement of Sanyal in the post he was holding at the date of his discharge and payment of all his wages up to the date of reinstatement within 15 days of the publication of the award in the Calcutta Gazette.

( 2 ) TWO objections have been urged against the award on behalf of the applicant. The first is that Sanyal was not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. The second is that, even if he were, he is not concerned in the dispute under Section 33 (1) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, so as to be competent to refer his discharge for the adjudication of the Tribunal under Section 33-A of the Statute.

( 3 ) THE application raises important and large questions of construction of the Industrial Disputes Act as well as the jurisdiction of this Court in granting the writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution.

( 4 ) BEFORE taking up the discussion of these questions, it is necessary to state the facts of the case briefly.

( 5 ) THE original reference of the industrial dispute between Messrs. Mcleod and Co. Ltd. and their workmen represented by Mcleod Indian Employees' Association to the Industrial Tribunal was made by an order dated the 13th November, 1956. The Schedule to the Order of Reference specified the points of dispute. While that reference was pending K. P. Sanyal made a complaint on the 31st January, 1957 to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act that his services were wrongfully terminated by Mcleod and Co. Ltd. on the 20th December, 1956. The Industrial Tribunal found in his favour by the award whose effect I have stated above, and made the order already mentioned. The present application is made by the employer, and seeks for a writ of certiorari to quash the award.

( 6 ) A preliminary point of objection has been taken on behalf of the respondent that in certiorari proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court does not act as a court of appeal and correct mere erroneous decisions in law. It is contended, therefore, on behalf of the respondent that even if the decision of the Industrial Tribunal is erroneous this court should not correct a mere erroneous decision by the constitutional writ of Certiorari.

( 7 ) MR. Niren De, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, 1954 SCA 620 : (AIR 1954 SC 440) (A), and specially where it quoted with approval at page 628 (of SCA) : (at p. 444 of AIR), the observations of the previous decision of the Supreme Court in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. , stating. "such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken, or the order to b