HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
P. B. CHAKRAVARTTI, S. C. LAHIRI
BARANAGORE JUTE FACTORY CO. LTD. - Appellant
Versus
HULASCHAND RUPCHAND - Respondent
A. F. O. O. 170 Of 1955
Decided On : MARCH 10, 1958
ARBITRATION - Second reference - Maintainability - Subsistence of original reference - Setting aside of award - Supersession of reference - Distinction - Rules of Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry - Applicability - Constitution of fresh arbitral court - Rule 7 - Rule 10 - Limitation - Rule 25 - Interpretation.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant and the respondent entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of jute. The contract contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry (the Chamber) under its rules. A dispute arose between the parties and the appellant referred it to arbitration. The Chamber constituted an arbitral court, which made an award in favor of the appellant. The respondent challenged the award and it was set aside by the court. However, the reference was not superseded. The appellant then made a second reference to the Chamber, which constituted a fresh arbitral court. The second arbitral court made an award in favor of the appellant. The respondent challenged the second award and it was set aside by the court on the ground that the second arbitral court was illegally constituted.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the second reference was not maintainable because the original reference was still subsisting. The court also held that the second arbitral court was illegally constituted because it was not constituted in accordance with the rules of the Chamber. The court further held that the second award was barred by limitation.
Issues: 1. Whether the second reference was maintainable? 2. Whether the second arbitral court was legally constituted? 3. Whether the second award was barred by limitation?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A second reference is not maintainable if the original reference is still subsisting. 2. The rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry provide for the constitution of a fresh arbitral court only in cases where the award made by the first arbitral court is a nullity. In all other cases, the original arbitral court continues to function. 3. The limitation period for making an award starts from the date on which the arbitral court enters on the reference. The date on which the arbitral court enters on the reference is the date on which it gives direction to the parties to file their respective statements.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from a judgment and order, dated 7th March, 1955, of Bachawat, J. , who has rightly observed that the case involves certain important questions of arbitration law. Those questions, some of which concern particularly arbitrations by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have arisen in the following way.
( 2 ) BY a contract entered into on 9th February, 1953, the appellant, The Baranagore Jute Factory Co. Ltd. , agreed to buy and the respondent, Messrs. Hulaschand Rupchand, agreed to sell a certain quantity of jute of certain specifications. The contract contained an arbitration Clause in the standard form prescribed by the Indian Jute Mills Association and provided inter alia that all disputes and claims"shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chaniber of Commerce and Industry under the rules of its Tribunal of Arbitration for the time being in force and according to such rules the arbitration shall be conducted"'. In addition to that general provision, the contract also contained certain special provisions regarding arbitration on claims relating to the quality or the condition of the goods. Clause 10 (2) of the contract emphasised further the obligation of the parties to have such claims decided by the arbitration of the Chamber and at the same time prescribed a period within which a reference to arbitration was to be made. It said :"all claims in relation to quality and/or condition shall be settled in no other way than by a reference to arbitration, as is in the contract provided for : but none shall be entertained unless submitted by the buyers to arbitration within two months of the date of delivery of the jute at the buyers' mill. "
( 3 ) CLAUSE 10 (3) of the contract provided what the form and contents of an award in favour of the buyers would be, if they succeeded on a claim in respect of the quality of the goods and/or excessive moisture in them. It said that if the award provided for an allowance of a certain percentage of the market difference between the grades of the goods contracted for and the next lower grade and/or found a moisture content in the goods supplied in excess of a certain percentage and stipulated an allowance therefor, the buyers would accept the goods with the allowance awarded and the sellers would be liable to pay to the buyers, in addition to the allowance, a penalty or penalties computed in a certain manner.
( 4 ) IN pursuance of the contract, the respondent delivered a portion of the jute contracted for, but the appellant, while accepting the goods, raised a question as to their quality and also alleged that they contained excessive moisture. The respondent was not prepared to admit those allegations and a dispute having thus arisen between the parties, it was referred by the appellant on 16th March, 1953, to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Thereupon, the Registrar of the Chamber numbered the reference as Case No. 233 of 1953 and constituted for its consideration a Court, consisting of one Mr. Carstairs and one Mr. Mccraw. The arbitrators made their award on 2nd April, 1953 after they had inspected the goods and by it directed that the appellant would retain the jute and the respondent would pay it certain allowances and penalties. The respondent did not accept the award and after sundry correspondence between the parties and certain further proceedings before the arbitrators to which it is not necessary to refer, the award was filed in Court. Thereupon the respondent made an application for setting aside the award and by an order, dated 28th August, 1953, S. R. Das Gupta, J. set it aside. The learned Judge held that the 'award had been made without jurisdiction but what he found was nof that the arbitral Court had been illegally constituted, nor that the Court was not competent to entertain the reference but only, as he made it clear in his judgment, that by reason of the provisions of Clause
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