The cause of action in a suit for ejectment is the infringement of the right to possession of the property. Identity of the cause of action is the test for determining whether a subsequent suit is barred under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code.

( 1 ) IN April, 1937, the appellant Mrs. L. A. Saunders entered into occupation of the disputed premises No. 8, Canal Street, Calcutta, as A tenant under the respondent's -predecessor. There was no written document creating or evidencing the lease but the rental was Rs. 101/47-per month and it was payable monthly according to the English calendar.

( 2 ) ON 15-9-1944, the respondent company (Messrs. Land Corporation of Bengal Ltd.) purchased the suit premises and the appellant's tenancy continued under them. In December 1949, the respondent company served upon the appellant a full 15 days' notice to quit requiring her to vacate the suit premises on the expiry of the said month and, on 6-2-1950, the present suit was instituted for her eviction. In the plaint there was an allegation inter alia that the plaintiff company required the suit premises bona fide for building and rebuilding purposes. That was also the allegation in the notice to quit and the bar of the Bent Control law against eviction was sought to be avoided on that ground.

( 3 ) THE suit was resisted on various pleas, but, for my present purpose, it is necessary to mention only four defences, namely, (i) that the suit was barred by reason of the dismissal of a previous suit for ejectment (ii) that the 15 days' notice to quit was illegal, invalid and insufficient as, under the law, a six months' notice was necessary to terminate the suit tenancy (iii) that the plaintiff's case of bona fide requirement for building and rebuilding purposes was untrue and (iv) that the suit tenancy was governed by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and the defendant was protected by the said statute from eviction.

( 4 ) THE learned Munsif overruled all the defences and decreed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal that decision was affirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge. Hence, the present Second Appeal by the tenant defendant.

( 5 ) IN support of the appeal Mr. Dutt urged the four defences, to which specific reference has been made above. The last two defences, however, may be disposed of without much discussion and, accordingly, for the sake of convenience, I take up the points in the reverse order.

( 6 ) THE defendant's tenancy admittedly included a residential building in the suit premises which formed part of the property let out to her. Clearly, therefore, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act can have no application to this case which falls to be governed by the Rent Control law. The defence under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and the defendant's claim of protection thereunder must, therefore, be overruled.

( 7 ) THE question of bona fide requirement also need not detain us long. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that the plaintiff's case that they require the suit premises bona fide for building and rebuilding purposes has been sufficiently proved. On the materials before me I have little hesitation in accepting the said finding. The Bench decision of this Court in the case of -- 'bhulan Singh v. Ganendra Kumar', lays down the guiding principles. in such matters and those principles fully support the plaintiff's case.

( 8 ) I take up now the defence plea of bar, based on the dismissal of the previous suit. The relevant facts are not in dispute and they appear as follows:

( 9 ) IN March 1949, the plaintiff served upon the defendant a notice to quit requiring her to vacate the suit premises on the expiry of that month. There also the plaintiff's allegation was that they (the Company) required the said premises for building and rebuilding purposes. The defendant, however, did not leave as required by the said notice and so a suit for ejectment waa instituted. That suit was eventually dismissed for default on 21-11-1949. Thereafter, the present notice to quit was served in December 1949 terminating the defendant's tenancy with the end of that month and the present suit was brought on 6-2-1950.

( 10 ) IN this suit the plaintiff's allegation is that the earl