CHAKRAVARTTI, C. J.

( 1 ) THREE points have been taken by Mr. Dutt in support of this appeal. They did not find favour with S. R. Das Gupta, J. , and do not commend themselves to us.

( 2 ) THERE was a contract entered into between the parties on the 26th of August, 1949, under which the appellant was to sell and the respondents were to buy 150,000 yards of hessian cloth. The respondent's case is that on 20-9-1949, the contract of August was settled by second contract under which they were to sell and the appellant was to buy precisely the same quantity of -hessian cloth. The price fixed under the first contract was Rs. 51-2-0 per 100 yards, but that fixed under the second contract was Rs. 60-8-0 also per 100 yards. On a reference being made to arbitration under a clause which is in the usual form to be found in the Indian jute Mills Association contracts, the arbitrators have made an award computed on the difference between the rates fixed under the two contracts.

( 3 ) MR. Dutt's first point before us was that since his client disputed the existence of the second contract altogether, the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to take notice of it or to determine the question of its existence. S. R. Das Gupta, J. , held that the shape of the case was not as put forward by Mr. Dutt, but that the respondent's pleading was that the first contract had been settled by the second contract and, therefore the arbitrators had jurisdiction under the arbitration clause contained in the first contract to decide whether the first contract had been settled in the manner alleged, just as they would have jurisdiction to decide if the liabilities under the first contract had been paid off. In my opinion, that view is plainly right and, in fact, Mr. Dutt did not seriously contend to the contrary.

( 4 ) THE second point taken by Mr. Dutt was that the arbitrators should not have made any award in respect of the contract at all, inasmuch, as the contract was for the sale of goods for export and it was hit by the provisions of the Jute Goods Control Order, 1949. Reference was made to the terms of the first contract and it was pointed out that delivery was to be given by placing the goods alongside an export vessel and it was contended that since the respondents purchased the jute for export and since they held no licence, the contract was an illegal one and therefore could not be the basis of an award. This contention can be disposed of on the short ground that the Jute Goods Control Order came about a month and a half after the date of the contract and there is nothing in its provisions to show that it was retrospective in operation. In the second place, the Jute Goods Control Order does not seem to have anything to do with the contract as between a local buyer and a local seller. The local buyer may, on purchasing the goods, require a licence to export them out side India and if he has no licence, he will be unable to export. That, however, does not mean that he cannot buy in the local market and that any contract between him and persons selling to him will be invalid, simply because he does not procure or is unable to procure an export licence. The first branch of the second point of Mr. Dutt must, therefore, fail.

( 5 ) THE second branch of the second point was that the arbitrators were wrong in computing the amount of their award on the difference between the rates fixed by the two contracts. This argument again was based upon the provisions of the Jute Goods Control Order, and the argument was that since the order laid down a ceiling price and since the rate alleged by the respondents to have been fixed by the contract of September was above that ceiling, the arbitrators had acted illegally in computing the measure of the damages by reference to a rate not warranted by ' Jaw. Again, it is impossible to see that the Jute Goods Control Order has any relevancy at all. In the first place, it is not retrospective in operation. In the second place, i

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