( 1 ) THIS Rule arises out of a proceeding for standardisation of rent started by the tenant petitioner. The proceeding has had a long and chequered career and the circumstances under which the matter has now come up to this Court are of an unusual character. The proceeding started as far back as April 11, 1951. It had its usual run from the Rent Controller to the Appellate Judge and then to this Court.

( 2 ) THE Rent Controller standardised the rent under the proviso to Section 9 (1) (f) of the Rent Control Act, 1950. On appeal it was held that the case was one under Section 9 (1) (g) of the said Act and as the learned Judge had no materials before him for standardising the rent under that section, he dismissed the tenant's application.

( 3 ) ON being moved against this appellate decision, this Court reversed the said decision and held that the case was quite within Section 9 (1) (f) of the Act and that, therefore, the residuary Section 9 (1) (g) could not apply. This Court, however, found, on the previous occasion, on an examination of the respective cases of the parties before it in the light of the materials on record that the disputed premises was not part of any construction within the meaning of the proviso to Section 9 (1) (f) of the Act and in that view of the matter this Court set aside the decisions of both the appellate Judge and the Rent Controller and sent back the case to the Rent Controller with a definite direction that the rent was to be standardised under the main part of Section 9 (1) (f ).

( 4 ) WHEN, however, the matter went back to the Rent Controller, he, after proceeding for sometime in terms of the above direction of this Court, eventually passed an order that as that decision in the present case was apparently overruled by a subsequent Bench decision given in another case, the parties must take appropriate directions from this Court once again before the Rent Controller could proceed with the matter.

( 5 ) IT is impossible to find any provision of law under which this order of the Rent Controller can be justified. The Court had given him a definite direction in this very case to proceed in a particular manner. The matter was not taken up to any higher tribunal and, therefore, the finality and effectiveness of this Court's decision, giving the said direction, remained wholly unaffected so far as the present case was concerned. Whether the said decision was right or wrong, it was, in the circumstances stated above, fully binding upon the Rent Controller and upon the parties to this case and must be taken to have finally settled the question as to which part of Section 9 of the Rent Control Act would apply to this case. The Rent Controller had no jurisdiction and, indeed, he had no business, to go behind that direction. His duty was clear and he had to standardise the rent in accordance with the direction given in this very case by this Court. Whether in another case a different view of the law was taken by this Court and even assuming that that was the position, though as we shall presently show such was not the case here, was wholly immaterial, so far as the present case was concerned, and the Rent Controller would have done well to confine himself within the limits of his jurisdiction and to follow up the direction, given to him by this Court, instead of being swayed by an apparent conflict between the two decisions, cited by him, and sending the parties over again to this Court for further direction. The order of the Rent Controller in that behalf is wholly unwarranted in law. It is, accordingly, set aside and the Rent Controller is directed to proceed with the case in terms of the direction given in Civil Revision Case No. 2236 of 1951 and to determine the rent of the disputed premises under the main part of Section 9 (1) (f) of the Act, as he was enjoined to do, in the light of the judgment in the said Civil Revision Case.

( 6 ) BEFORE we part with this case it is necessary and indeed, it is

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