The State is not prohibited from making special provisions for women, notwithstanding the prohibition against discrimination based on sex, as long as such provisions are made in favor of women and are reasonably tailored to achieve their intended purpose.

( 1 ) THE appellant, who is a girl-student, applied to the Hooghly Mohsin College for admission in the 3rd Year class with Honours in Economics and her application being finally refused, she moved this Court for the issue of certain writs in order to the enforcement of what she claimed to be her fundamental right of being considered for admission to the College. Her case is that the refusal of her application was based solely on the ground of her sex and thus a contravention of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution and that it was also mala fide. The way in which she has been dealt with by the Education Department is that while being refused admission to the Mohsin College, she, like other eligible girl-students, has been offered facilities for attending the Honours classes in that institution, provided she got herself admitted in (the "women's College which was recently established in the locality and which, at present, gives instruction only in the Pass courses. Bose, J. , who heard the appellant's application, held that the allegation of mala fides had not been proved; and as regards the alleged violation of Article 15 (1), he held that the alternative arrangements made at Hooghly for the collegiate education of women students constituted a special provision for the benefit of women within the meaning of Article 15 (1) and since such provision made substantially equal, though not wholly identical, facilities available to women students, Article 15 (1) had not been violated. The learned Judge however, had occasion to make some adverse comments on the conduct of the then. Principal of the College.

( 2 ) THE facts are fairly clear and so far as they are disputed in the affidavits, the truth appears from the documentary annexures, except with regard to one matter to which I shall refer later. It appears that the appellant passed her Intermediate Examination from the Mohsin College, being placed in the second division and on the 9-7-1951, she applied for admission to the Third Year class of the College with Honours in Economics. On 10th July she was told by the then Principal, one Shri Sudhir Kumar Ghosh, that by reason of an order of the Director of Public Instruction, no girl student who had passed in the second division could be admitted to the College as an Honours student and that she should seek admission in the local Women's College. In her application to this Court the appellant states that the Principal told her that no girl student who had passed in the second division could be admitted to the Mohsin College at all, but what the Principal in fact told her appears sufficiently from the letter which her father addressed to the Director of Public Instruction on 19th July. However, upto 18th July at various interviews with her father and herself which took place on 12th, 13th, 17th and the 18th, the Principal continued to give an alleged order of the Director as the reason for refusing admission to the appellant. In the meantime, the appellant made enquiries at the Women's College and obtained a certificate from the Principal of that institution that it had no affiliation in any Honours subject, but the Principal of the Mohsin College still declined to admit her on the ground of the bar imposed by the Director. The ex-Principal who has sworn a long and rambling affidavit has not ventured to deny the specific allegation that he turned away the appellant on the ground that an order of the Director barred the admission of women students who had passed in the second division. On 19th July, the father of the appellant, Shri Surendra Nath Roy, made a written representation to the Director of Public Instruction in which he stated that an order passed by him, barring the admission of women students-who had passed in the second division-was being set up against his daughter. On that very day, the Director of Public Instruction wrote to the Principal to remind him of the actual terms of the order, which was con