The meaning of the word "building" in the context of the Income-tax Act, 1961, should be understood in the context of the relevant provisions of the Act and in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case.

( 1 ) THIS is a, reference under Section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the question before us is as follows: "whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that no depreciation was admissible on drains, culverts, roads, etc. ?"

( 2 ) THE statement of the case relates to the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67. The assessee is a company. It claimed depreciation on the actual, cost of construction of drains, culverts, roads, etc. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the expenditure incurred on construction of these assets did not bring into existence assets eligible for allowance of depreciation.

( 3 ) THE assessee filed appeals. As the drains, culverts, roads, etc. , were constructed outside the plinth of the bungalows and were spread over in a big area, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not accept the contention made on behalf of the assessee that these assets were integral parts of the bungalows. Since the word "building" has not been denned in the Act, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, by following its ordinary meaning as stated in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, held that these drains, culverts, roads, etc. , were "buildings" and directed the Income-tax Officer to allow the appropriate depreciation.

( 4 ) THE department then filed appeals. It was argued on its behalf that the word "building" should be understood in its ordinary or common parlance, i. e. , in its popular sense. According to the departmental representative, the word "building", in its popular sense, is understood as an enclosure of walls made of bricks, stone, mud, etc. , coverd by a roof and, therefore, to include in the meaning of the word "building" such items as drains, culverts, roads, etc. , will be to do violence to its meaning in its common parlance or popular sense. Accordingly, it was argued that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was wrong in holding that these assets were "buildings" and in directing the Income-tax Officer to allow the depreciation on these assets.

( 5 ) IT was argued, on behalf of the assessee, on the other hand, that these assets were "buildings" and in support of this contention reliance was placed on an earlier order of the Appellate Tribunal in the case of Indo-Burma Petroleum Company Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer being I. T. A. No. 20117 of 1966-67 in which it was held that the driveway and compound wall of a petrol pump station should be treated as part of that building.

( 6 ) THE Tribunal; however, did not follow its aforesaid earlier order. In its opinion the word "building" should be understood in which it is understood by a common man in preference to its scientific or technical meaning. It also said "if we were to call drains, culverts and roads as 'buildings' it would not pass off normally unnoticed and the persons hearing it would feel something strange about it". In that view of the matter, the Tribunal held that these assets could not be treated as buildings and allowed the appeals and sustained the orders of the Income-tax Officer.

( 7 ) THOUGH the word "building" has not been denned in the Act, we do not approve the observations of the Tribunal quoted earlier. Further, the expression "common man" does not mean a stranger who does not know the facts and the circumstances of the case. Moreover, the ordinary meaning of a word is that meaning which is given in the ordinary English dictionaries and not in the scientific or technical dictionaries.

( 8 ) SINCE the word "building" has not been defined in the Income-tax Act, 1961, its meaning should be understood in the context of the relevant provisions of the Act and in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. An open air swimming pool and a roofless large stadium constructed at a considerable expense would be "buildings" as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshiam Das v. Debi Prasad, but not the brick kiln which was the subject-matte