The court held that the plaintiffs can be granted liberty to withdraw from the present suit with liberty to sue the defendant afresh because the ground of reasonable requirement was not legally available to them at the date when the present suit was instituted much within three years from the date of acquisition because of the prohibition contained in section 13 (3a).

( 1 ) THE application filed by the plaintiffs for leave to withdraw from the present suit with liberty to sue the defendant afresh ought to have been allowed and the impugned order, giving rise to this revision, rejecting the application, must be quashed.

( 2 ) THE plaintiffs-petitioners, after acquiring the house in 1981, have filed the present suit in 1982 for eviction of the defendant-respondent on the ground of unauthorised sub-letting and several other grounds. The suit having been 51ed within three years of the acquisition of the house by the plaintiffs, could not be grounded on the reasonable requirements of the plaintiffs for own occupation, even if such a ground was then existing, in view of the provisions of sub-section (3a) of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, countermanding institution of suit on that ground before the expiry of such period. The period of three years has however expired during the pendency of the suit and on such expiry the plaintiffs applied to amend the plaint to include the ground of reasonable requirement; but the application was rightly rejected as any such amendment, if allowed, would have rendered the mandate of section 13 (3a) almost infructous and the position in law on this point is now absolutely well-settled. To allow the plaintiff to include the ground of reasonable requirement in a plaint in a pending suit, instituted before the expiry of three years after acquisition, even though the period of three years has expired when the amendment is applied for, would virtually enable him to do precisely what the law prohibits him from doing.

( 3 ) THE plaintiffs then have applied for leave to withdraw from the present suit with liberty to sue the defendant afresh on the grounds sued upon as well as the ground of reasonable requirement. The Court below has rejected that application and has ruled that the plaintiffs cannot be granted that liberty. We do not know why.

( 4 ) THE plaintiffs can obviously proceed with the present suit founded on the grounds of sub-letting etc. Even if the suit fails, there is nothing in law to prevent the plaintiffs to sue the defendant again for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement and the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure can not obviously stand in the way for snore reasons than one. Firstly, the claim for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement was not legally available to the plaintiffs at the date when the present suit was instituted much within three years from the date of acquisition because of the prohibition contained in section 13 (3a ). The view of the Court below, that the grounds of ejectment specified in section 13 (1) of the Act do not constitute the cause of action for ejectment, but the cause of action is the determination of the tenancy is wholly erroneous and must be rejected. But even accepting the same arguendo, since the plaintiffs could not, in view of section 13 (3a), include the ground of reasonable requirement in the plaint when the present suit was instituted, the provisions of and the prohibition in Order 2, Rule 2 cannot obviously operate in respect of any subsequent suit for eviction on that ground. Secondly, Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2, Order 2 disentitles a plaintiff from suing for a relief in a subsequent suit if the same was available to him in an earlier suit in respect of the same cause of action. But cause of action for a suit for eviction on the ground of unauthorised sub-letting and for a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement are not the same.

( 5 ) THE position under the preceding Act of 1950 and that under the present Act of 1956 are quite different. Under the Act of 1950, the cause of action for a suit for eviction of a tenant was still the determination of the tenancy under the general law of landlord and tenant and all that the proviso to section 12 (1) of the Act of 1950 provided was that no eviction 'could