The proviso to Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, which prohibits requisition of land used by an educational institution, must be interpreted liberally and purposively, and does not apply where the purpose of the requisition is to further secure the institution's possession and use of the land.

( 1 ) I have had the advantage of going through the judgment preparred by my learned brother Ray, J. and I am glad to express my full concurrence. I agree with Ray, J. that the appeal is to be allowed and that the order of requisition, passed under Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, assailed with success in the Court below, is to be upheld for the reasons stated in appreciable details by my learned brother. But my unqualified concurrence notwithstanding, I have thought it fit to add a few words in respect of the proviso to Section 3 (1) of the aforesaid Act. I am inclined to hold that the words of the Proviso warrant liberal, and not literal, approach and should be purposively construed without any rigid adherence to the letters of the law.

( 2 ) SUB-SECTION (1) to Section 3 of the Act authorises requisition of, land by the State Government, with a view' to its subsequent acquisition,, for certain purposes specified therein and one such purpose is "maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community". Though Mr. M. P. Banerjee appearing for the writ petitioner, Respondent No. 1 before us thought it fit to concede, Mr. A. P. Chatterjee arguing the case at a later stage, has seriously contested that imparting of education by establishing University or other educational institution is at all essential to the life of the community within the meaning of Section 3 (1 ). This argument must at once be repelled as the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 597 and the wave of decisions following Maneka (supra) have settled it beyond doubt that the expression "life" vis-a-vis a human being can never mean the mere animal or physiological existence but would also include anything and everything that is necessary for the growth, sustainance and development of its rational self and its intellectual and moral faculty. I may, by the way, refer to one such post-Maneka decision of the Supreme Court in Francis Coralie Mullain, AIR 1981 SC 746 where , the expression "life" in Article 21 of the Constitution has been construed to include "facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse form" and that brings in education. This, if I may add, is in perfect consonance with our ancient cultural heritage, according to which the object of human life is to achieve liberation, liberation from ignorance, prejudices, selfishness, avarice and all that and proper education alone can effect such liberation - Sa Vidya Ya Vimuchyaye". To contend that education is not essential to our community is to concede that we have not reached even the rudimentary stage of civilisation and that the effulgence of our ancient cultural heritage of the oldest pedigree is now engulfed in abyssmal darkness. I must, therefore, hold, in agreement with Ray, J. , that requisition for the purpose of a University or other educational institution is for a purpose essential to the life of our community within the meaning of S. 3 (l) of the Act.

( 3 ) THE Proviso to Section 3 (1), however, provides that "no land used for the purpose of religious worship or used by an educational. . . institution shall be requisitioned under this Section". It is not disputed that the land and structures sought to be requisitioned in this case were already in the occupation of the appellant Jadavpur University as a tenant and the writ petitioner, who has now purchased the property and is a respondent before us, has accordingly urged that the land in question being already in the use and occupation of an educational institution, could not be requisitioned even for that institution, in view of the prohibition contained in the Proviso. Ray, J. , has repelled this contention mainly on the ground that the same was at pleaded by the writ petitioner in his petition which has accordingly deprived the appellant from meeting or otherwise contesting this question. I am, however, inclined to thi