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High Court Of Calcutta
S. B. SINHA, BASUDEVA PANIGRAHI
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD. - Appellant
Versus
PARTHA SARATHI BANERJEE - Respondent
APPEAL FROM ORIGINAL ORDER 936 Of 1994
Decided On : 09/30/1994
PROBATIONARY PERIOD - DISCHARGE OF SERVICES - LEGAL RIGHT TO CONFIRMATION - PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE - INTERPRETATION OF APPOINTMENT LETTER - SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW - DIRECTIONS TO COMPETENT AUTHORITY FOR RECONSIDERATION:
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was appointed as a Probationary Development Officer by the appellant company. The initial probation period was 12 months, which could be extended by a further period not exceeding 12 months. Confirmation in the service was not automatic and required a letter of confirmation from the company. During the probationary period, the petitioner failed to achieve the target set for premium collection. The probationary period was extended twice, and during the extended period, the petitioner achieved the target. However, the company discharged the petitioner's services without assigning any reason.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the company to confirm his services, as he did not have a legal right to be confirmed automatically upon completion of the probationary period. The court also held that the company was not required to comply with the principles of natural justice before discharging the petitioner's services, as the discharge was not a punishment. However, the court found that the company had discharged the petitioner's services on an irrelevant consideration, namely, the failure to achieve the target during the initial probationary period, when the target had been achieved during the extended probationary period.
Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner had a legal right to be confirmed in the service upon completion of the probationary period? 2. Whether the company was required to comply with the principles of natural justice before discharging the petitioner's services? 3. Whether the company had discharged the petitioner's services on an irrelevant consideration?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the petitioner did not have a legal right to be confirmed in the service upon completion of the probationary period, as the offer of appointment clearly stated that confirmation was not automatic and required a letter of confirmation from the company. 2. The court held that the company was not required to comply with the principles of natural justice before discharging the petitioner's services, as the discharge was not a punishment. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Unit Trust of India v. T. Bijaya Kumar, Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology Bangalore v. Dr. Pandurang Gadwalkar, and M. Venugopal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A. P. , and. Anr. 3. The court held that the company had discharged the petitioner's services on an irrelevant consideration, namely, the failure to achieve the target during the initial probationary period, when the target had been achieved during the extended probationary period.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the single judge, and directed the competent authority of the appellant company to consider the matter afresh and pass an appropriate order strictly in accordance with law at an early date, and not later than 6 weeks from the date of communication of this order.
( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 10th March, 1994, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in C. O. No. 8215 (W) of 1994, whereby and where under the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 questioning an order of discharge dated 23rd February 1990, as contained in Annexure 'c' to the writ petition was allowed and the appellant company was directed to allow the writ petitioner to join his services forthwith and confirm the petitioner as he had fulfilled the pre-condition for getting confirmation. It was further directed that the writ petitioner would be entitled to be paid full salary during the intervening period,
( 2 ) THE fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass.
( 3 ) THE writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 was appointed as a Probationary Development Officer at Chandil attached to Jamshedpur Branch under Ranchi Divisional Office, by an offer of appointment dated 18/22-2-88. In the said letter of appointment, it was inter alia, provided as follows:"initially, you will be on probation for a period of 12 months which the Company may at its discretion extend by a further period not exceeding 12 months. Confirmation in the services shall not be automatic, on fulfilment of the above conditions, unless a letter of confirmation is specifically issued by the Company. Unless letter of confirmation or extension of probationary period is issued to you, your services shall stand automatically terminated after expiry of the period of probation. During the probationary/extended probationary period you are liable to be discharged without notice and without assigning any reason whatsoever for such discharge. "in the said letter, it was further stated:"in view of the revision of the scheme you will have to satisfy the new conditions relating to premium target. "
( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, during the initial period of probation, the petitioner produced a premium of Rs. 82,006/- against a target of Re, 2,00,000/ -. The probation period was, therefore, extended for a further period of 3 months by the appellant company in terms of its letter dated 30th March 1989, wherein it was stated:"we refer to our letter No. CR : DEV; STAFF (PROB) dated 18/22. 2. 88 appointing you as a probationary Development Officer with effect from 25. 2. 88. During the probationary period from 25. 2. 88 to 24. 2. 89, you have produced a premium of Rs. 82,006/- against the target set for Rs. 2. 00 lace. We find that you have not fulfilled the said target. On a reference to Head Office, they have advised us to extend your probationary period for a further period of six months from 25. 2. 89 to 24. 8. 89. We do hope that during the extension period you will generate more business to reach the target and come out to our expectation. The other terms and conditions of our letter of appointment will remain unaltered. "
( 5 ) THE probationary period of the writ petitioner was further extended by the appellant by a letter dated 1. 1. 90 for a further period of 6 months by way of last extension. It is an admitted case that during the aforementioned period, the petitioner had procured business to the extent of Rs. 1,19,043/-, thus totaling a sum of Re. 2,01,049/ -. The service of the writ petitioner was discharged by the impugned letter dated 23rd February 1990, which is contained in Annexure 'c' to the writ application, which is Annexure 'b' to the petitioner for stay. In the said letter it was stated :"you have been working as a Probationary Development Officer since 25. 2. 88. As per Clause 4 of the Letter of Appointment dt. 18/22. 2. 88 you are required to procure a premium of Rs. 2 lace during the probation. Since you have not completed the required target during the initial period of probation, the probationary period was extended up to 24. 2. 90. Despite repeated reminders sent from office you have not improved your performance. Therefore, in terms of Rule 5 (4) of the Letter of Appointment you are he
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