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1992 Supreme(Cal) 240

High Court Of Calcutta
GITESH RANJAN BHATTACHARJEE
TUSHAR ROY - Appellant
Versus
SUKLA ROY - Respondent
Criminal Revision 972  Of  1992
Decided On : 06/24/1992

Advocates Appeared:
AMIT TALUKDAR, Amitava Karmakar, Sanapna Bhuniya, SUKUMAR GUHA

Blood test is not permissible in law for determining the paternity of a child born during the wedlock of the husband and the wife. The conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act can be rebutted only by showing that the husband and the wife had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten.

Headnote:

PATERNITY - BLOOD TEST - LEGITIMACY - EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 - SECTION 112 - INTERPRETATION - CHILD BORN DURING MARRIAGE - CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF LEGITIMACY - REBUTTAL - NON-ACCESS - BLOOD TEST NOT PERMISSIBLE.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner/husband filed a revisional application challenging the order of the learned Magistrate refusing his prayer for blood group test of the child for ascertaining whether he or anybody else is the father of the child born during the wedlock of the husband and the wife.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that blood test is not permissible in law for determining the paternity of a child born during the wedlock of the husband and the wife. The Court further held that the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act can be rebutted only by showing that the husband and the wife had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten.

Issues: 1. Whether blood test is permissible in law for determining the paternity of a child born during the wedlock of the husband and the wife? 2. Whether the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act can be rebutted by blood test?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that blood test is not permissible in law for determining the paternity of a child born during the wedlock of the husband and the wife. The Court relied on Section 112 of the Evidence Act, which provides that the fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten. 2. The Court held that the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act can be rebutted only by showing that the husband and the wife had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten. The Court held that blood test is not a permissible method of rebutting the presumption of legitimacy.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the revisional application filed by the petitioner/husband.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:

  1. Blood tests are not legally permissible for establishing the paternity of a child born during a valid marriage. The law presumes the child's legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, which can only be rebutted by proving that the spouses had no access to each other during the relevant period (!) .

  2. The conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 can only be challenged by demonstrating that the husband and wife did not have access to each other at any time when the child could have been conceived. Blood tests are not recognized as valid evidence to rebut this presumption (!) (!) .

  3. The language of Section 112 indicates a strong, conclusive proof of legitimacy, and only specific evidence such as proof of non-access during the entire conception period can effectively rebut this presumption. Scientific evidence like blood tests is not admissible for this purpose under Indian law (!) (!) .

  4. The interpretation of the term "access" includes opportunities for marital intercourse during the period when conception could have occurred. The law requires proving non-access over the entire conception window, not just at the time of birth or a single moment (!) (!) .

  5. Blood tests can only potentially exclude a person from paternity; they cannot definitively establish biological paternity due to scientific limitations. Therefore, they are not conclusive proof of non-paternity and are not admissible to challenge the presumption of legitimacy (!) (!) (!) .

  6. The law emphasizes the importance of protecting family stability and morality, which influences the strictness of the presumption of legitimacy. Rebutting this presumption through scientific means like blood tests is considered inappropriate under current legal and social conditions (!) (!) .

  7. In the context of Indian social and legal circumstances, the use of blood tests to determine paternity during a valid marriage is not favored. The potential social stigma, scientific limitations, and the purpose of protecting family integrity outweigh the benefits of such scientific evidence at this stage (!) (!) (!) .

  8. The law restricts the admissibility of evidence derived from scientific tests like blood grouping, especially when they are used as a basis for challenging the presumption of legitimacy. The law also does not permit compelling individuals to undergo blood testing without their consent (!) (!) .

  9. The possibility of drawing adverse inferences from refusal to undergo blood testing exists in some jurisdictions, but such inferences are considered risky and may lead to injustice, particularly given the social context and scientific limitations in India (!) (!) .

  10. Overall, the current legal framework and social considerations in India do not support the use of blood tests for establishing or challenging paternity in cases of children born during marriage. The legal presumption of legitimacy remains robust, and scientific evidence is not recognized as sufficient to rebut this presumption (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .

Please let me know if you need further assistance or clarification.


GITESH RANJAN BHATTACHARJEE, J.

( 1 ) THE question that falls for consideration is whether blood group test is permissible in law for determining the paternity of a child born during the wedlock of the husband and the wife. The question has arisen in a proceeding under S. 125, Cr. P. C. for maintenance claimed against the husband by the wife for herself and the minor daughter born during the wedlock. The husband doubts the fidelity of the wife and he wants blood-group test of the child for ascertaining whether he or any body else is the father of the child. The learned Magistrate refused the prayer of the husband for blood group test. Against such refusal the petitioner/husband has come up in this Court.

( 2 ) MR. Sukumar Guha, the learned Advocate for the petitioner argued that blood group test should be allowed for determining the paternity of the child, In a recent decision in Criminal Revision No. 800/92 (Gautam Kundu v. Shaswati Kundu), where a similar question arose, I have held in my judgment dated the 22/04/1992 that in view of the provision of S. 112 of the Evidence Act there is no scope of permitting the husband to avail of blood test for dislodging the presumption of legitimacy and paternity arising of S. 112 of the Evidence Act, where the husband had admittedly access to and sexual intercourse too with the wife at the relevant time. The fact that a child was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between a woman and her husband is a conclusive proof that the said child is the legitimate child of that man unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been. begotten. Mr. Guha argued - and I must say, it is a very novel argument - that under S. 112 the husband is entitled to show that at the relevant time he had no access to the wife and this he can successfully show by blood test evidence if such test establishes that the husband is not the biological father of the child, for in that case blood test evidence becomes an evidence of the husband's non-access to the wife at the relevant time, namely, the time precisely when the conception took place by dint of sexual act of someone else. There is no doubt that when S. 112 of the Evidence Act was drafted and enacted there was no possibility of determining the paternity of a child by blood test evidence because science was not at that stage as it is now. But then a deeper study would reveal that S. 112 was couched in a carefully warded language and was enacted for a purpose which is much wider than the purpose of filling up the gap of any possible uncertainty about the paternity of a child where a doubt on the point is raised by any suspicious mind. The conclusive presumption under S. 112 is rather based on a sound police of affording protection to the sanctity and stability of family relationship so that for every trifling suspicion or for oblique purpose the question of legitimacy of a child born or conceived in the wedlock does not become a handy target of scandalisation and indecent investigation. It may be noticed that S. 112 does not draw the comparatively weaker presumption falling within the ambit of the expression 'shall presume' as defined in S. 4 of the Evidence Act. In S. 4, it is stated that whenever it is directed that the Court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. S. 112 could very well have been so drafted as to provide that where a person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man the Court shall presume that he is the legitimate son of that man. In that case in view of the definition of the expression 'shall presume' as given in S. 4 it would have been open to the contending party to disprove the presumption by adducing evidence in disproof of the presumed fact, as for example, by blood test. Had it been a matter falling within the ambit of 'shall presume' the contending party wo















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