A complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, must relate to a deficiency in goods or services, and the complainant must be a person who has hired or availed of such goods or services.

( 1 ) THIS writ application, at the instance of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority, arises out of a complaint made by the Respondent No. 7, Mr. Mohan Lal Bazaz, to the District Forum under S. 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

( 2 ) THE complaint was in respect of the writ petitioner's scheme to construct a public convenience at the Netaji Park on Chittaranjan Avenue. On the basis of the said complaint, the District Forum passed an order restraining the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority, hereinafter referred to as "cmda", from making any further construction in pursuance of its aforesaid scheme.

( 3 ) THE CMDA preferred an appeal against the said order to the State Commission under S. 15 of the aforesaid Act. The said appeal was admitted on 22/02/1991, and the order passed by the President of the District Forum on 15/01/1991, was stayed. Thereafter, on 6/04/1991, the CMDA was restrained from constructing the privy or from making any other construction at the Nataji park (opposite to Mahajati Sadan) on Chittaranjan Avenue, till the matter was taken up for complete hearing on 20/04/1991. The matter was not, however, taken up for hearing on 20/04/1991, but was adjourned till 7/06/1991, since the Respondent No. 7 was not present.

( 4 ) IN this background, the CMDA filed the instant writ petition.

( 5 ) ON 25/06/1991, when the writ application was moved, it was submitted on behalf of the CMDA that the District Forum had no jurisdiction at the initial stage to entertain the complaint of the Respondent No. 7, under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. At that stage, this Court was prima facie of the view that in view of the provisions of S. 2 (d) of the aforesaid Act, the complaint filed before the District Forum by the Respondent No. 7 was not maintainable, as the said complaint appeared to be outside the scope of the Act, and this Court was entitled to decide the question relating to lack of initial jurisdiction.

( 6 ) AT the time of final hearing of the writ petition, it was submitted on behalf of the Respondent No. 7 that in view of the scheme of the aforesaid Act, the writ Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition in view of the pending proceedings before the District Forum and the State Commission. It was submitted that in view of the provisions of the aforesaid Act, the High Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition in respect of orders passed under the said Act. It was urged that the writ petitioner's relief, if any, lay before the Supreme Court and that the instant writ application was liable to be dismissed with costs.

( 7 ) IN support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Nayek, referred to a single Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Padmanavan v. Consumer D. R. Forum, reported in 1991 (X) CPR 505. In the said case the Kerala High Court was of the view that as the Consumer Protection Act provides efficacious alternate remedy, a writ would not lie for such remedy.

( 8 ) MR. Nayek also referred to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Ansal Properties and Industries (P) Ltd. v. Shri Chander Bhan Kahli, reported in 1991 (1) CP 679. In the said case the Delhi High Court was considering the question as to whether a writ petition could be entertained on the question as to whether any complaint in respect of any immovable property could be entertained by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The Delhi High Court held that when the Consumer Protection Act provides a machinery, including an appeal to the Supreme Court, it would not be proper for the High Court to entertain a writ petition on the aforesaid question.

( 9 ) THE law as explained in the two cases cited by Mr. Nayek proceeds on the basis that where an Act provides efficacious alternate remedy, a writ petition would not lie. In fact, the learned single Judge observed that remedy under Art. 226 could be resorted to only in t