High Court Of Calcutta
S. K. MUKHERJEE, NRIPENDRA KUMAR BHATTACHARYYA
CALCUTTA DIOCEASIN TRUST ASSOCIATION (P) - Appellant
Versus
MRINAL CHOWDHURY - Respondent
F. M. A. T. 2285 Of 1992
Decided On : 02/19/1997
BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT - SECTIONS 324 AND 333 - INTERPRETATION - NOTICE BY MUNICIPALITY TO STOP CONSTRUCTION WORK - VALIDITY - CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF NOTICE - ABSENCE OF PRIOR PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM PARENT BODY - REVOCATION OF POWER OF ATTORNEY - LEGALITY OF GRANT - FACTUAL CONTROVERSY - OPPORTUNITY TO APPELLANT TO BRING MATERIALS ON RECORD - REMAND OF WRIT APPLICATION.
Fact of the Case:
The Burdwan Municipality issued a notice to the writ petitioner to stop construction work based on doubts about the leasehold right of the land and the validity of the grant. The writ petitioner challenged the notice, arguing that the criteria required by sections 324 and 333 of the Bengal Municipal Act were not fulfilled. The trial court quashed the notice, finding that the required criteria were absent and the notice was illegal.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that there was a substantial factual controversy regarding the authority of the person who granted the lease deed to the writ petitioner, as well as the legal enforceability of the grant due to the absence of prior permission in writing from the parent body and the express prohibition of the grantor from dealing with the matter. The court also found that the added appellant, the owner of the property, had not been given an opportunity to place on record its factual contentions.
Issues: 1. Whether the notice issued by the Municipality was valid in light of the criteria set forth in sections 324 and 333 of the Bengal Municipal Act? 2. Whether the appellant, the owner of the property, was entitled to an opportunity to present its case before the trial court?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted sections 324 and 333 of the Bengal Municipal Act and found that the criteria for issuing a notice to stop construction work were not fulfilled in the present case. 2. The court applied the principle of natural justice and held that the appellant, as an added respondent, was entitled to an opportunity to present its case before the trial court.
Final Decision: The court set aside the trial court's order quashing the notice and remanded the writ application for a fresh hearing, granting the appellant an opportunity to bring relevant materials on record.
( 1 ) THESE two appeals are directed against the same order, passed by a learned single Judge of this court, dated 2nd July, 1992 in C. O. No. 6261 (W) of 1992. The two appeals are at the instances of the respondents to the main writ application. The appellants in FMAT 2453 of 1992 were impleaded as parties to the writ application and the appellant in FMAT No. 2285 of 1992 had been added as party on the date the impugned order had been passed, on the basis of an application preferred on behalf of the appellant for such addition on 18th of June, 1992.
( 2 ) THE subject matter of challenge before the learned trial Judge was a notice, issued by the Burdwan Municipality, asking the writ petitioner to stop the work of construction in terms of a plan sanctioned by the said Municipality on the ground that there was scope for some doubt about leasehold right of the land and/or as regards validity of the grant.
( 3 ) AS we have already indicated, the learned trial Judge disposed of the Writ application by setting aside and quashing the impugned notice on the same date the appellant in FMAT No. 2285 of 1992 had been added as a party, obviously without any opportunity being granted to it to canvass its case through affidavit. While doing so the learned trial Judge construed the provisions of sections 324 and 333 of the Bengal Municipal Act and came to a factual finding that the required criteria in terms of the said statutory provision being absent in the case, the notice issued by the Municipality was untenable and illegal.
( 4 ) WHILE arguing the appeals, detailed submissions had been made on behalf of the appellants as also on behalf of the contesting respondent writ petitioner. To be precise, written submissions also were filed. The scrutiny of the submissions made on behalf of the contesting parties unequivocally indicates that there is substantial factual controversy regarding the authority of Reverend S. K. Kisku, who on the strength of power of attorney, purported to grant the lease deed in question in favour of the respondent, apart from the legal enforceability of the grant due to the absence of prior permission in writing of the parent body and express prohibition of the said Reverend Kisku from dealing with the matter. Indeed, it has been very strongly contended that at the time the building plan in question was signed by Reverned Kisku, his power of attorney stood revoked the fact which had been allegedly withheld from the Municipality, the sanctioning authority. As against such submission, on behalf of the writ petitioner/contesting respondent, it was, inter alia, pleaded that in terms of the deed, dated 4th July, 1987, and in view of the receipt and appropriation of money paid by the writ petitioner/respondent, Kisku was under an obligation and legal liability to append his signature for sanction of the building plan. II was further pleaded that the appellant's endeavour to get injunction before the Civil Courts also proved abortive and lastly the criteria required by the statutory provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, which vested authority in the Municipality ill take steps as were under challenge in the writ proceeding, not being fulfilled the said sections could not be said to have been attracted.
( 5 ) WE have bestowed our anxious consideration on the aforesaid materials. Admittedly the added respondent, one of the appellants before us, which was the owner of the property in question, had no opportunity to place on record the factual contentions, which cannot be said to be absolutely irrelevant or deserving no consideration in the context of the dispute or controversy involved. The impugned order of the learned trial Judge does not also reflect that he had occasion to advert to such factual aspects. Following the dictum or principle laid down by the apex court in the case of S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Other reported in AIR 1981, Supreme Court, page 136 (para 19) we are not inclined to pre
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