Divorced Muslim women are entitled to fair provision and maintenance beyond the iddat period until remarriage, as per the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act and section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order passed by the 5th Judicial Magistrate, Sealdah in a proceeding under section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in M-37/93. The opposite party No. 1 was the husband of the revision-petitioner and their marriage was solemnised on 5th of May, 1991 as per Muslim rites and customs against Den Mehr amount of Rs. 2500. The said Marriage was entered into Nikah Nama in the office of the Muslim Marriage Registrar and Kazi.

( 2 ) THE petitioner has claimed to have given some dowry at the time of their marriage. Sometimes after marriage their matrimonial life did not end peacefully and, therefore, the petitioner, however, was forced to leave the private respondent's house in February, 1993. Thereafter a case was registered under section 498a and 406 IPC. At the moment the case under section 498a is still pending. The revision-petitioner filed an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 18. 5. 93 against the opposite party No. 1 and the learned Magistrate granted maintenance of Rs. 800/- per month for Iddat period from 18. 5. 93 to 15. 7. 93 over and above Den Mehr amount of Rs. 2500/ -. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said order has preferred this revision.

( 3 ) ALTHOUGH the copy of the revisional application was served upon the private respondent but none has appeared on his behalf.

( 4 ) THE learned advocate appearing for the revision-petitioner has submitted that the learned trial Court has wrongly construed the provisions of section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The expression such as "all reasonable and fair provisions and maintenance to be made and to be paid to her" should be construed liberally and it should not be interpreted very rigidly. It has been further stated that the provisions "it shall indicate that something should be provided in advance for meeting some needs apart from the maintenance of a divorced Muslim lady. " The applicability of provision of section 125 Cr. PC to a Muslim woman had however, appeared for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the above decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the provisions of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure override the Personal Law. Thereafter the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was enacted in the parliament. The provision of sub-section (3) of section 127 Cr. PC was also interpreted by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Hamidan v. Mohd. Rafiq reported in 1994 Crl. LJ 348 wherein it has been held as follows:"we find that the appellant has not challenged the finding recorded by the Family Court that the appellant has been divorced by the respondent. So the matter relating to enhancement of maintenance allowance is to be considered on the basis of this finding. According to the provisions of section 125 (3) (c) the right to receive maintenance allowance cannot be restricted to the period of Iddat only in the case of a divorced woman. Learned counsel for the appellant is, therefore, right in his submission that no such restriction should have been imposed by the Family Court and instead, it should have been provided that the Appellant shall continue to be paid maintenance allowance until her remarriage, if any. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respondent and we find that the Family Court has given good reasons for the enhancement of allowances granted to the appellant and her two children earlier. The cost of living has no doubt increased and it makes no difference whether the person to whom the maintenance allowance is being given is a divorced women or a married woman. The allowance is given for the maintenance of the woman concerned and not merely her status. We find that there is no force in the contention raised on behalf of the respondent. "

( 5 ) AGAIN the same provision was also interpret