The provisions of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 clearly bar any injunction to be passed restraining a party from initiating any proceedings.

( 1 ) THE appeal is admitted. This case emanated from an order passed by the learned Seventh Civil Judge (Senior Division), Alipore wherein the learned judge passed an interim order of injunction overlooking the basic provisions of law as also the well-settled principles settled by the apex Court in granting ad interim order of injunction.

( 2 ) THE facts of this case are briefly stated hereinafter.

( 3 ) THE respondent availed credit facilities from the appellant in respect of a civil constructon project, namely 'diamond Tower'. The case of the respondent before the Alipore court was that an agreement was entered into by and between the parties with regard to repayment of the loan amount. Despite such agreement being entered into by and between the parties, the appellant herein made a demand through its Advocates and threatened legal proceedings in case of default.

( 4 ) SIMULTANEOUSLY, with the filing of the suit, the respondent made an application before the learned Judge under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and obtained an ex parte ad interim order of injunction restraining the appellant from initiating any proceedings in terms of the said letter of demand. Mr. Basu appearing for the appellant attacked the impugned order on two counts :i. The Order is hit by the provisions of Section 41 (b) of the Specific relief Act, 1973. II. Reasons, if any, recorded in the said order are not adequate in passing an ad interim order of injunction and that too ex parte.

( 5 ) IN support of his first contention, Mr. Basu has cited Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank. In support of his second contention Mr. Basu cited the case of Shib Kr. Chadda.

( 6 ) MR. pradip Ghosh appearing for the respondent contended that the alleged agreement in question was entered into by and between the parties and without cancellation of the said agreement the appellant herein is not entitled to issue any notice of demand or initiated any proceedings. Mr. Ghosh also contended that the impugned order has been passed by the learned judge after recording reasons. According to mr. Ghosh the reasons given in the impugned order are adequate in passing an ex parte ad interim order of injunction. Mr. Ghosh lastly contended that the appellant without availing the provisions of Order 39, Rule 4 is not entitled to assail the said order before us. In support of his contention Mr. Ghosh cited two decisions reported in AIR 1976 Madras 350 and AIR 1982 Karnataka 105. Mr. Ghosh also cited Supreme Court decision reported in 1999 (2) SCC 377.

( 7 ) SECTION 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act dearly bars any injunction to be passed restraining a party from initiating any proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of cotton Corporation (supra), inter alia, held that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant an order of injunction restraining a person from initiating a proceeding in the Court not subordinate to it, as a relief, ipso facto temporary relief cannot be granted in the same terms. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that in appropriate cases Court can grant temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent power in cases not covered under Order 39 of the C. P. C. But while exercising its inherent power the court should not overlook the statutory provision which clearly indicates that injunction to restrain initiation of proceedings cannot be granted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that it must be remembered that inherent power of the court cannot be invoked to nullify and/or stultify a statutory provison. Although Mr. Basu appearing for the appellant has argued that the alleged agreement was not acted upon even if we accept the contention of Mr. Ghosh to the extent that the said agreement was a valid one and the notice of demand is bad, the suit is not maintainable. In case the appellant opts for initating a proceeding on the basis of a notice alleged to be bad, it may do so at its own ris