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2001 Supreme(Cal) 761

High Court Of Calcutta
Amitava Lala
GOPAL LUKHARIA - Appellant
Versus
PRAXAIR INDIA LIMITED - Respondent
T.  1199  Of  2000
Decided On : 12/18/2001

Advocates Appeared:
AJOY CHATTERJEE, ASHOK BANERJI, SHYAMAL K.SARKAR, SOUMEN SEN

A decree passed in an 'undefended suit' cannot be construed as an ex parte decree. The principle of 'ex parte' is governed by the circumstances when one was prevented by a sufficient cause. However, when one did not choose to contest the suit and the suit was placed under the heading 'undefended suit', the decree passed cannot be construed as ex parte.

Headnote:

ORDER 9 RULE 13 - CONDONATION OF DELAY - SUFFICIENT CAUSE - EX PARTE DECREE - UNDEFENDED SUIT - LIMITATION ACT, 1963, ARTICLE 123.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a company, filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to recall or set aside an ex parte decree passed against it. The application was filed beyond the 30-day limitation period prescribed under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing various reasons, including the negligence of its advocates and the conversion of the company from a private limited to a public limited company.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the explanations provided by the petitioner for the delay were not sufficient to justify condonation of delay. The court observed that the petitioner had entered appearance through its advocates but failed to take any steps to file a written statement or seek an extension of time. The court further noted that the suit was placed under the heading of 'undefended suit' due to the petitioner's non-appearance and non-filing of a written statement, and that the petitioner's name did not appear in the list of cases on the date the decree was passed.

Issues: 1. Whether the delay in filing the application to recall or set aside the ex parte decree should be condoned? 2. Whether the decree passed in an 'undefended suit' can be construed as an ex parte decree?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the explanations provided by the petitioner for the delay were not sufficient to justify condonation of delay. The court observed that the petitioner had entered appearance through its advocates but failed to take any steps to file a written statement or seek an extension of time. The court further noted that the suit was placed under the heading of 'undefended suit' due to the petitioner's non-appearance and non-filing of a written statement, and that the petitioner's name did not appear in the list of cases on the date the decree was passed. 2. The court held that a decree passed in an 'undefended suit' cannot be construed as an ex parte decree. The court observed that the principle of 'ex parte' is governed by the circumstances when one was prevented by a sufficient cause. However, when one did not choose to contest the suit and the suit was placed under the heading 'undefended suit', the decree passed cannot be construed as ex parte.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petitioner's application for condonation of delay and to recall or set aside the ex parte decree. The court also vacated the interim order passed in the case and made it clear that the judgment debtor could take the defense relating to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of the decree before the Court of Execution under Section 47 of the CPC.

AMITAVA LALA, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an application basically under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure along with various other reliefs. This application has been made by the pen of Personnel Manager (East) and constituted attorney of the company on 5th September, 2000 for the purpose of recalling the decree dated 12th January, 2000 in C. S. No. 430 of 1999 (Gopal Lukharia v. Praxair India Limited ). In the instant application the defendant/petitioner also prayed for various reliefs in connection with the execution application arising out of decree being G. A. No. 1859 of 2000.

( 2 ) IT is pertinent to mention here that the application was admittedly made out of time prescribed under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Article 123 of the Limitation Act says that a period of thirty days is fixed for such application which will be counted from the date of the decree or where the writ summons or notice was not duly served when the applicant have knowledge of the decree. It appears that both the parts are distinctive from each other. From the facts narrated by the defendants/petitioner it appear not only the writ of summons was served but the defendant/petitioner company entered into appearance through their respective solicitors/advocates firm on 5th October, 1999. Therefore, under no stretch of imagination it can be construed that writ of summons or notice was not served upon the defendant so that they can apply for recalling or setting aside the decree on the date of their knowledge of the decree. Thus, it is crystal clear that thirty days period is specific for such application from the date of the decree which already expired.

( 3 ) HOWEVER, following the Original Side Rules prayer for condonation of delay is made in the instant application instead of making it separately unlike the procedure available elsewhere. Therefore, Court is duty bound to hear out the explanation for condonation of delay. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 says that an application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Therefore, such expression will definitely come out from the averments made in the petition. I find from the paragraph 10 of the petition that the petitioner entered into appearance on 5th October, 1999 but no step was taken from then till 15th November, 1999 due to the Puja vacation admittedly. The petitioner contacted with the advocates on record and the advocates on record advised to supply him necessary papers, documents for the purpose of preparation of written statement. It is further contended that some of the papers and documents were supplied in second week of November, 1999 but upon going through the same it was advised to produce further documents to make a complete defence. Certain other explanations are given for collection of papers from different places and also conversion of the company from the nature of the private limited to the nature of the public limited etc. as well as replacement of Vice President (Finance) in January, 2000. According to me, the explanation as yet given is self-contradictory in nature since in one hand the petitioner has stated that he has contacted with the advocates on record after opening of the Court on 15th November, 1999 but on the other hand, he has stated that the certain papers and documents relating to the case was made available to the advocates on record in the second week of November, 1999. I fail to appreciate as to why no step has been taken till such time by the petitioner, being a company controlled by the persons having legal knowledge and backed by the well-equipped solicitors/advocates firm by taking out any application for extension of time to file written statement of that score. It is immaterial for the Court to give any concession at this belated stage to consider all the explanations for having relevant documents for the purpose of taking defenc

















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