The first paragraph of Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, which prescribes the exclusion of the day of commencement in calculating the term of a lease, is subject to any agreement to the contrary intended by the parties.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal, against an order of remand preferred by the plaintiff and it arises out of Title Suit No. 141 of 1978 of the Second Court of the learned, Munsif at Arambagh.

( 2 ) ON 21st Bhadra 1369 B. S. corresponding to Sept. 7, 1962 one Radhika Prasad Nath (since deceased), husband of the plaintiff granted lease of the suit premises in favour of defendant-respondent for a period of 15 years from 1st of Aswin 1369 B. S. till the last day of Bhadra 1384 B. S. The lease was for business purpose and the monthly rent was rs. 76/ -. Radhika Prosad by a deed of settlement gave away the suit property to the plaintiff for her life. The lease was to expire on the expiry of Bhadra 1384 B. S. and the plaintiff by a notice dt. Aug. 10, 1977 called upon the defendant to quit and vacate the suit premises on the expiry of the term of the lease and to deliver peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff. Such possession not having been delivered, the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit for recovery of possession.

( 3 ) THE defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement. He denied the material allegations made by the plaintiff and further disputed the plaintiffs right to demand delivery of possession or issue the notice D-Aug. 10, 1977 as issued by her. According to the defendant, he had been running a business in the suit premises and since he could not oblige the plaintiff by conceding the demand for an abnormal increase of the rent payable by him, the plaintiff had brought this false suit on false allegations.

( 4 ) ON these pleadings several issues were raised including an issue as to whether the notice to quit was served and if served whether it was valid, whether the plaintiff reasonably required the premises for her own use and occupation and whether the defendant was a defaulter or not. No specific issue was raised on the point as to whether the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) have any application or not.

( 5 ) THE parties adduced evidence including the registered deed of lease Ext. 1. The only issue that was substantially pressed before the learned Munsif was as to whether the plaintiff alone can sue for possession. In view of the deed of settlement the learned Munsif decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit on the basis that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the suit property on the expiry of the lease by efflux of its tenure. Though the learned Munsif found due service of notice dated Aug. 10, 1977 upon the defendant, he did not go into the question of its validity obviously because he was decreeing the suit on the expiry of the lease. The issues with regard to the plaintiffs reasonable requirement or default on the part of the defendant to pay rent were neither pressed nor decided. The defendant preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 200 of 1981. The learned subordinate Judge. First Court. Hooghly allowed the appeal. The learned Subordinate Judge held that since sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 3 of the said Act were inapplicable to the lease in dispute, lessee was entitled to all the protections under the said Act. Since, according to the learned Subordinate Judge, the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain a decree for possession against the lessee except on one or more of the grounds specified in S. 13 (1) of the said Act, he set aside the decree passed by the learned Munsif and remanded the suit for re-trial and adjudication of the issues with regard to the reasonable requirement and default as also the issue with regard to the validity of the notice. That is the judgment dated Sept. 15,1982 which is the subject matter of challenge before us in this appeal.

( 6 ) MR. Ghose, appearing in support of this appeal, has contended that the learned Subordinate Judge clearly misread the provisions of S. 3 of the said Act in holding that the disputed lease does not come within the purview