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1987 Supreme(Cal) 338

High Court Of Calcutta
A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, AJIT KUMAR NAYAK
SHYAMALI SARKAR - Appellant
Versus
ASHIM KUMAR SARKAR - Respondent
Civil Rule 3048 (F)  Of  1985
Decided On : 09/18/1987

Advocates Appeared:
B.K.BACHAVAT, H.B.PAL, K.J.SENGUPTA, O.P.JHUNJHUNWALA, R.P.MITRA

An application under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act for permanent alimony is not a "petition under this Act" within the meaning of Section 19 and therefore does not have to be filed in the district court. The court that granted the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has jurisdiction to entertain an application for permanent alimony under Section 25.

Headnote:

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT - SECTION 25 - PERMANENT ALIMONY - JURISDICTION - COURT GRANTING DECREE FOR RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS CAN ENTERTAIN APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT ALIMONY - PROVISIONS OF SECTION 19 DO NOT APPLY TO APPLICATIONS UNDER SECTION 25.

Fact of the Case:

Wife filed an application under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act for permanent alimony after the court granted her a decree for restitution of conjugal rights on appeal. The husband opposed the application, arguing that it should have been filed in the district court under Section 19 of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that an application under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not a "petition under this Act" within the meaning of Section 19 and therefore does not have to be filed in the district court. The court further held that the court that granted the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has jurisdiction to entertain an application for permanent alimony under Section 25.

Issues: 1. Whether an application under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is a "petition under this Act" within the meaning of Section 19? 2. Whether the court that granted the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has jurisdiction to entertain an application for permanent alimony under Section 25?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that an application under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not a "petition under this Act" within the meaning of Section 19 because: a. The expressions "application" and "petition" have different connotations. b. Section 25 provides for proceedings for pendente lite and permanent alimony, which can be initiated only as consequential to another original proceeding for any of the substantive reliefs under Sections 9 to 14. c. The use of different words in the same Statute indicates that the Legislature intended to make a distinction between them. 2. The court held that the court that granted the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has jurisdiction to entertain an application for permanent alimony under Section 25 because: a. Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act authorizes "any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act" to order payment of permanent alimony. b. A court hearing appeals under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act and granting or refusing reliefs under the Act is exercising jurisdiction under the Act. c. The words "at the time of passing any decree" and "on an application made to it" in Section 25 indicate that the court that passed the decree has jurisdiction to entertain an application for permanent alimony.

Final Decision: The court allowed the wife's application for permanent alimony and directed the husband to pay her Rs. 500 per month.

A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J.

( 1 ) A petition by the applicant-wife for restitution of conjugal rights under S. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, dismissed by the trial court, has been decreed by this Court on appeal. The wife has now filed this application in this Court under S. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act for permanent alimony. In opposing this application, Mr. Bachawat, the learned Counsel for the husband/opposite party, has urged that this Court cannot entertain this application which is to be filed in the 'district Court' in accordance with the provisions of S. 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Mr. Bachawat has submitted that the present application ought to have been filed in the City Civil Court which is the 'district Court' within the meaning of the Act, where the original petition for restitution of conjugal rights was presented in accordance with S. 19 of the Act. For better appreciation and facility of discussion, the relevant portions of S. 19 and S. 25 of the Act are reproduced hereinabove :-"19. Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the district court within local limits of whose ordinary civil jurisdiction - (i) the marriage was solemnized; (ii) the respondent at the time of presentation of the petition resides; or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided; or. . . "section 25. (i) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband shall pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties, and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immoveable property of the respondent".

( 2 ) MR. Bachawat has urged that an application under S. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is nevertheless a "petition under this Act" within the meaning of S. 19 and must, therefore, be filed in the 'district Court' (here, the City Civil Court) under and in accordance with S. 19.

( 3 ) THE expressions "application" and "petition", though sometimes used indiscriminately to denote the something, have different connotations also. An "application" for example, unless otherwise expressly provided, may even be oral, as would appear, for example, from the provisions of Art. 134a of the Constitution, the provisions of R. 11, O. 21 of the Civil P. C. and the catena of cases decided under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. But a "petition" must and cannot but be in writing. That these two expressions have different connotations, would also appear from the provisions of S. 2 (a) and (b) of the Limitation Act of 1963; for otherwise, even as late as in 1963, those clauses would not have expressly defined the word "application" to include a "petition" and the word "applicant" to include a "petitioner". When a statutory definition defines "a" to include "b", then ordinarily, though not invariably, the implication is that "a" would not have, but for such definition, included "b". While recommending the insertion of these new definitions in the Limitation Act of 1963, the Law Commission in its Second Report on Limitation (S. 9, page 5) observed that "the object is to provide a period of limitation for original petitions and applications under special laws". These observations would also indicate that the word petition, when used in juxtaposition to the word application, would mean petitions of original nature, that is, petitions which would initiate and found proceedings of original nature which are independent of and not consequential to any other proceedings.

( 4 ) THE Hindu Marriage Act has provided for four substantive reliefs like restitution of conjugal rig





















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