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1988 Supreme(Cal) 222

High Court Of Calcutta
A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, AJIT KUMAR NAYAK
MITA GUPTA - Appellant
Versus
PRABIR KUMAR GUPTA - Respondent
A. F. O. D.  129  Of  1982
Decided On : 06/02/1988

Advocates Appeared:
B.KUMAR, J.P.SRIVASTAVA, N.B.Roy, Shyamal Sur

Deliberate and positive acts of actual or physical obstruction by a spouse to frustrate all bona fide attempts on the part of the other spouse to effect re-union would constitute 'wrong' within the meaning of Section 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, disentitling such spouse from obtaining a decree for divorce under Section 13 (1a) (ii).

Headnote:

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT - SECTION 13 (1A) (II), 23 (1) (A) - DIVORCE - NON-RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS - WRONG WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 23 (1) (A) - DELIBERATE OBSTRUCTION BY HUSBAND TO FRUSTRATE WIFE'S ATTEMPTS TO EFFECT RE-UNION - WHETHER CONSTITUTES WRONG - EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN DHARMENDRA V. USHA AND SAROJ RANI V. SUDARSHAN.

Fact of the Case:

Husband filed a petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty, desertion, and non-restitution of conjugal rights for more than a year after a decree for restitution was passed in favor of the wife. The trial court negated the first two grounds but granted divorce on the third ground.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that mere non-compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not, by itself, amount to 'wrong' to disentitle the spouse against whom the decree is passed to obtain divorce under Section 13 (1a) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, deliberate and positive acts of actual or physical obstruction by such spouse to frustrate all bona fide attempts on the part of the other spouse to effect re-union would be such a 'wrong'.

Issues: 1. Whether mere non-compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights constitutes 'wrong' within the meaning of Section 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act? 2. Whether deliberate obstruction by the husband to frustrate the wife's attempts to effect re-union constitutes 'wrong' within the meaning of Section 23 (1) (a)? 3. Whether the husband is entitled to a decree for divorce under Section 13 (1a) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, despite his alleged acts of obstruction?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the Supreme Court decisions in Dharmendra v. Usha and Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan, which held that mere non-compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is not a 'wrong' within the meaning of Section 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 2. The court distinguished the present case from the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in Geeta Laxmi v. Sarveswara Rao, where the husband had committed positive acts of ill-treatment and driven the wife out of the house. The court held that such positive acts of obstruction would constitute 'wrong' within the meaning of Section 23 (1) (a). 3. However, the court found that the husband's alleged acts of obstruction occurred after the one-year period of non-restitution had already expired. Therefore, the husband was not taking advantage of any 'wrong' by his alleged acts and was entitled to a decree for divorce under Section 13 (1a) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the wife's appeal and affirmed the trial court's decree for dissolution of marriage.

A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J.

( 1 ) A petition for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by the respondent-husband on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the wife-appellant and also on the ground of non-restitution of conjugal rights for more than one year after the passing of a decree to that effect between the parties. The trial court has negatived the first two grounds but has decreed divorce on the third ground.

( 2 ) EVEN though the grounds of cruelty and desertion alleged by the respondent-husband have been decided against him, the petition for divorce filed by him having been decreed in his favour, the husband, even as a respondent, could, as provided in O. 41, R. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, have urged, and that without filing any cross-objection, that the petition for divorce ought to have been decreed on those two grounds also. But the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband not having done that, the only question that would require our consideration in this case is whether the trial Judge was right in decreeing divorce on the ground of non-restitution of conjugal rights between the parties for more than one year after a decree for such restitution was passed in favour of the wife-appellant against the husband-respondent.

( 3 ) THE legislative laws on the point are not in doubt; but, as is not unusual, the case-laws clustering round them are not that clear. The relevant legislative provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act may be reproduced hereinbelow :-"13.--------- (1a) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground - (1) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of true year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties. 23.----------- (1) In any proceeding under this act, whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that - (a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner. . . . . is not in any way taking advantage of his or her wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and. . . . . . (e) there is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted,

then, and in such case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief accordingly,"

( 4 ) THEREFORE all that is necessary to justify a decree for divorce under these provisions are - (A) a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or for judicial separation between the petitioner and the respondent, whosoever might be the decree-holder; (b) non-resumption of conjugal relation between the parties for a period of one year or upwards; (c) the petitioner not in any way taking advantage of his or her wrong or disability; and (d) non-existence of any other legal ground warranting refusal of the relief prayed. 4a. The first question that has arisen in this case in that if one spouse has obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the other spouse, can the latter, against whom a decree is passed, without taking any steps to comply with the decree and to restore conjugal rights to the former, still invoke the provisions of S. 13 (1a) (ii) on the ground of such non-restitution for one year or more and be entitled to a decree for divorce under those provisions or would he or she be denied such relief on the ground that he or she has committed "wrong" within the meaning of S. 23 (1) (a) by not taking any steps towards the restitution of conjugal rights and, therefore, cannot be allowed to take advantage of such wrong?

( 5 ) S. 13 (1a) has been inserted by the Amendment Act of 1964 in repla










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