A stay order granted by an Appellate Court encompasses the entire suit, including any interlocutory proceedings, and prevents the trial Court from taking any further steps in the suit, including hearing an application for amendment of the plaint.

( 1 ) THESE two appeals involve two questions- (1) whether the trial Court could proceed with the hearing of the application for amendment of the plaint and allow amendments thereof in view of the order staying the suit passed by this Court and (2) whether the amendments allowed by the trial Judge are justified on merits. An affirmative answer to both the questions will entail dismissal of the appeal while a negative answer to any of the questions would require us to allow the appeal and to set aside the impugned order allowing amendments.

( 2 ) THE suit giving rise to tire impugned order under these two appeals has been filed by the respondent R. M. Investment and Trading Company Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as R. M. I.) against the appellant Boeing Company (hereinafter referred to as Boeing) being Suit No. 363 of 1990 in the Original Side of this Court. There was an agreement, labelled as "consultant Service Agreement," between the appellant Boeing and the respondent R. M. I. whereunder R. M. I. was to promote sales of the commercial aircrafts of the Boeing to parties within the territories of India on condition of certain remuneration payable to R. M. I. by Boeing for rendering its service. A part of the remuneration being the fixed retainer was duly paid by the Boeing to R. M. I. , but it was the case of R. M. I. that it was not paid any further remuneration as was payable under the Agreement. R. M. I. has filed the aforesaid suit for the recovery of the unpaid amount of the remuneration along with incidental reliefs against Boeing. There is also a claim for the said amount on a quantum meruit basis.

( 3 ) THE Consultant Service Agreement between the parties has an Arbitration Clause in a very wide form as will appear from Clause 10 of the Agreement. On the strength of the said Arbitration Clause, Boeing moved an application under section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 for stay of the aforesaid suit. The trial Court has dismissed the application but on appeal, the application has been allowed and the aforesaid suit has been stayed under section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961.

( 4 ) BUT while admitting the appeal on 19th April, 1993, it was ordered inter alia that "there shall also be an order of stay of the suit being No. 363 of 1990 (RM. Investment Trading Co. (P ). Ltd. v. Boeing Company) till the hearing of the appeal. " The application or amendment of the plaint, which was filed earlier, was nevertheless proceeded with by the trial Court in spite of the aforesaid order of stay of the suit while admitting the appeal. The first question, as already stated, therefore, is whether the trial Court could so proceed in view of the aforesaid order of stay of the suit while admitting the appeal on 19th April, 1993.

( 5 ) IN support of the impugned order allowing amendments of the plaint during the operation of the order of stay, it has been urged on behalf of the respondent R. M. I. that a stay of the suit does not prevent the Court from passing interlocutory orders including an order of the amendment of the plaint. In support of the contention, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Senaji Kapur Chand v. Pannaji Devi Chand (AIR 1922 Bom 276) of the Allahabad High Court in Kulsumum v. Md. Farooq (AIR 1969 Allahabad 479) and of the Mysore High Court in Baburao Vithalrao v. Kadarappa (AIR 1974 Mysore 1963), but all these decisions relate to an order of stay under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure whereunder what is stayed is not the entire suit but only the trial thereof. A suit commences with the presentation of the plaint, but the trial of the suit begins at a much later stage. Therefore, when the whole of the suit is not stayed, but what is stayed is only the trial of the suit, an interlocutary order, not amounting to the trial of the suit, may be permissible. But, as already noted,