BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an application for leave to prefer an appeal at the instance of a third party to the suit against the judgment and decree dated 30th January, 2006 passed by the learned Judge, 7th Bench, city Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 1459 of 2005 on the basis of compromise of the parties.

( 2 ) THE respondent No. 1, an association represented by the respondent no. 2, its Secretary, filed a suit against the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, two other associations thereby praying for declaration that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to take part in the Annual General Meeting of the respondent no. 3 scheduled to be held on 28th September, 2005 and also in the proceedings for election of the office bearer of the respondent No. 4 for the year 2005-06 with further declaration that the respondent No. l was entitled to carry on its duty and function with its existing office-bearers till its successors are appointed through a General Meeting to be held with the agenda of election of office bearers of the respondent No. l and for permanent injunction restraining the respondents Nos. 3 and 4, their men, agents and members from creating any obstruction or any inconvenience to the office-bearers of the respondent No. 1 from taking part in the Annual General Meeting and also in the election proceedings to be held on 28th September, 2005.

( 3 ) THE said suit was decreed in terms of compromise effected between the plaintiffs and the defendants.

( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the present applicant claiming to be a member of the plaintiff-respondent No. l has preferred an appeal before this Court being f. A. T. No. 769 of 2006 along with the present application for leave to file the said appeal on the ground that the Executive Committee of the respondent no. l, which was defunct at the relevant time, was not competent to enter into such compromise in order to frustrate the right of the members and that he would be virtually and substantially affected by the decree. The present applicant further described the decree as fraudulent and collusive.

( 5 ) MR. Tandon, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that his client being prejudicially affected by the compromise decree should be permitted to prefer the present appeal.

( 6 ) AFTER hearing Mr. Tandon, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and after considering the fact that the decree impugned is a compromise decree in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in our view, the present first appeal is not at all maintainable, in view of clear bar created under section 96 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

( 7 ) MR. Tandon in this connection relied upon the provisions contained in order 43 Rule 1a of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that his client can definitely challenge the decree by pointing out that the decree was a fraudulent one and that the person who actually signed the compromise had no such authority.

( 8 ) MR. Tandon further submits that in view of Order 23 Rule 3a of the code, a fresh suit is barred and as such, his client has no other alternative but to prefer an appeal against such compromise decree. In support of such contention, Mr. Tandon relies upon two decisions, one in the case of Banowari lal vs. Chando Devi, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 and the other in the case of Morium Bibi and Ors. vs. Sowkatara Begum and Ors. , reported in 98 CWN 1074.

( 9 ) IN our opinion, the aforesaid contention of Mr. Tandon is a misconceived one. According to Order 23 Rule 3a of the Code of Civil Procedure, a fresh suit at the instance of the parties to compromise on the basis of which decree was passed is barred and if any of the parties to the alleged compromise is of the view that such compromise was effected by practising fraud or otherwise not lawful, it is his duty to apply before the self-same Court and the said Court should decide whether such compromise should be recorded. If the Court ove

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