A subsequent application for pre-arrest bail is maintainable even after an earlier application was dismissed as not pressed, provided that the applicant satisfies the court about the circumstances that made withdrawal of the earlier application imperative and that the withdrawal was not for any strategic reason or lack of bona fide intentions.

Girish Chandra Gupta, J. -The petitioners approached this Court praying for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner No.1 is the father and the petitioner No.2 is the son. Accusation against them amongst others has been made by the wife of the petitioner No.2 under Section 498-A, 406,323 and 354 of the IPC.

2. Briefly stated the allegations are that the complainant Sangeeta was married to the petitioner No.2 on 1st March, 2008. The marriage was duly consummated. After having lived together for some time the husband/petitioner No.2 and his parents demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakh. It is alleged that in order to ensure the happiness of the complainant her parents had already given a sum of Rs. 2 lakh together with 10 bharis of gold, furniture. utensils and household goods but that allegedly did not satisfy the greed of the accused persons. They demanded a further sum of Rs. 5 lakhs. When the demand was not met she was subjected to both physical and mental torture. It is also alleged that the petitioner No. 1. the father-in-law of the complainant. used to make indecent advances and as a matter or fact attempted to rape her. The husband of the complainant refused to believe this when the aforesaid act of his father was brought to his notice. The mother-in-law of the complainant, it is alleged, instigated her son to physically assault her. It is also alleged that the mother of the complainant was also not spared. The father-in-law of the complainant allegedly assaulted her.

3. An application seeking pre-arrest bail was presented by the father-in-law on 28th January 2011. The complaint is dated 17th November 2010. The application made by the father-in-law was dismissed as not pressed by this Bench by an order dated 3rd February 2011 pursuant to the prayer of the learned Advocate for the petitioner Shibram Bhowmick. Subsequently on 4th February 2011 another application under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed by Mr. Shibram Bhowmick and his Son Pinku Bhowmick alleging. inter alia, as follows:

"No application for anticipatory bail has been preferred by the petitioners before this Hon'ble Court in connection with the instance case."

4. It is this application which was taken up for hearing. It was contended that the prayer of the petitioner. No. 1 Shibram Bhowmick cannot be entertained because he had his application for pre-arrest bail dismissed as not pressed on 3rd February, 2011. Mr. Dey, learned senior advocate appearing for the de facto complainant opposed the prayer for any anticipatory bail to any of the petitioners. Mr. Sen, learned senior advocate appearing in support of the petition drew our 'attention to Black's Dictionary in order to impress upon us that withdrawal simply means "the act of taking back". He contended that by withc1rawing an application the Court was not requested to consider the matter. Therefore there is no room for the argument that the Court is being asked to decide the matter over again. His second submission was that an application for anticipatory bail is an interlocutory matter for which Court may be approached repeatedly. He in support of his submission relied on the judgment in the case of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat. 1988 (2) SCC 271. He drew our attention to paragraph 24 wherein the following views were expressed:

"At the conclusion of the hearing on the legal aspect, Shri Poti. learned counsel appearing for the State Government contended, on instructions, that an order passed by a Designated Court for grant or refusal of bail is not an 'interlocutory order' within the meaning of Section 19(1) of the Act and therefore an appeal lies. We have considerable doubt and difficulty about the correctness of the proposition. The expression 'interlocutory order' has been used in Section 19(1) in contradistinction to what is known as final order and denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature. The essential test to d