CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, AMULYA KUMAR NANDI, JJ.
DESBO ALIAS NIRMALA NASKAR ALIAS NIRMALMOY NASKAR
VERSUS
STATE AND OTHERS
Criminal Revision No. 2514 of 1983,
Decided On : 28 -3 -1991
CRIMINAL LAW - COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES - S.307 IPC - S.320(4)(b) AND S.320(9) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE - OFFENCE U/S. 307 IPC NOT COMPOUNDABLE - COURT CANNOT PERMIT COMPOUNDING OF SUCH OFFENCE - MAhesh CHAND V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (AIR 1988 SC 2111) DISTINGUISHED.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was convicted u/S. 307 of the Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for five years. The victim of the offence is now dead and before the court, the heirs of the victim of the offence have filed an application praying that the parties may be granted permission to compound the offence and the accused-petitioner may be acquitted.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the offence u/S. 307 of the Penal Code, not being compoundable u/S. 320 or any other provision of the Criminal P. C., the victim himself, if alive, could not be permitted to compound the offence and, therefore, could transmit no right to his heirs to pray for such permission.
Issues: Whether the court can permit the compounding of an offence u/S. 307 of the Penal Code, which is not compoundable u/S. 320 of the Criminal P. C.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the provisions of S. 320(9) of the Criminal P. C. categorically provide that "no offence shall be compounded except as provided under this S. 320." Therefore, the court cannot permit the compounding of an offence u/S. 307 of the Penal Code, which is not compoundable u/S. 320 of the Criminal P. C.
Final Decision: The court maintained the order of conviction but reduced the period of sentence to the period already undergone.
A. M. Bhattacharjee, J.: - After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the State and examining the records ourselves, we have not been able to discover any infirmity in the Order of conviction, passed by the trial Judge and affirmed in appeal, to warrant our interference in revision. But for the reasons stated hereunder we propose to alter the sentence.
2. The accused, convicted u /S. 307 of the Penal Code, has been sentenced to imprisonment for five years. The victim of the offence is now dead and before us in this Court, the heirs of the victim of the offence have filed an application praying that the parties may be granted permission to compound the offence and the accused-petitioner may be acquitted. As provided in S. 320(4)(b) of the Criminal P. C. when the person who would otherwise be competent to compound the offence is dead, his legal representatives may, with the consent of the Court, compound such offence. But the offence u/S. 307 of the Penal Code, not being compoundable u/S. 320 or any other provision of the Criminal P. C., the victim himself, if alive, could not be permitted to compound the offence and, therefore, could transmit no right to his heirs to pray for such permission.
3. Though the position ought to have been the same even without the aid of the provisions of S. 320(6), the sub-section has nevertheless expressly provided that "a High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its powers of revision u/S. 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this Section". We are, however, afraid that the expression "powers of revision u/S. 401" is rather inappropriate in respect of Court of Session, which exercises powers of revision, not u/S. 401, but under S. 399, which, and which alone, defines and determines the revisional powers of a Court of Session and has made the powers exercisable by the High Court u/S. 401, also available to the Court of Session. We must also note the rovisions of S. 320(9), which, without leaving the matter to the ambivalent and ambulatory rules of interpretation of statutes, has categorically provided that "no offence shall be compounded except as provided under this S. 320."
4. Mr. Dutt, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has, however, drawn our attention to a two-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1988 SC 2111) and has urged that since the Supreme Court in that case permitted an offence to be compounded, even though the same was not compoundable u/S. 320 we would not be acting illegally in permitting the parties to compound the offence u/S. 307 of Penal Code, notwithstanding the legislative mandate to the contrary in S. 320(9) of the Criminal P.C. If it could be shown that the Supreme Court went on doing so in cases after cases, we might have thought that we would not be going wrong in following the course so often resorted to by the apex Court of the Land and we might have derived some assurance, from the pronouncement of Manu, our most respected ancient Law-Giver (Manu Samhita, chapter IV, verse 178) to the effect that in case of doubts arising out of contrary mandates, one should follow the course adopted by the forefathers and would commit no wrong by doing so "Yenasya Pitaro Yata, Yena Yata Pitamahah, Tena Yayat Satang Margang, Tena Gachchan Na Dusyate". But we have not been referred to any other decision in which the Supreme Court adopted such a course to enable us to hold that our Superior Court has sanctioned the course by repeated recourse.
5. Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on us as absolute authority, not only under the mandate under Art. 141, but even de hors that Article, because of the precedent-bound system of Judicial administration, borrowed by us from the Britishers and followed by us with almost devotional rigidity. And, therefore, if the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand (supra) made a declaration of law to th
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