A suit for injunction is not maintainable in a case involving an employment contract of personal nature, as such contracts cannot be specifically enforced under Sections 14(1)(b) and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Taron Chatterjee, J.

M/s. Mahindra Engineering & Chemical Products Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Company) is the appellant before us. The plaintiff/respondent Ashoke Kumar Ghosh, was appointed as Deputy Sales Manager of the Company by entering into a contract of service. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff/respondent, Ashokc Kumar Ghosh, was appointed as Deputy Sales Manager of the Company by entering into a contract of service. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff/respondent, Ashoke Kumar Ghosh against the Company for the following reliefs:

(a) A decree declaring that the plaintiff has been illegally pressurised by the defendants to make over charge of his present post of Dy. Sales Manager on 20.9.94 in violation of the terms and conditions of his appointment letter and the plaintiff is still in his present employment at the Calcutta Office of the defendant No. 1 and entitled to monthly salary and other benefits which the plaintiff enjoyed so long:

(b) ...... a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from terminating the service of the plaintiff from his present post of Dy. Sales Manager at Calcutta Office of the defendant No.1.

2. This suit was filed on 30th of September, 1994. On the same date an application for grant of temporary injunction under Order 30 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff-respondent. The said application for temporary injunction was moved for an ex parte order of injunction restraining the company-appellant from terminating the service of the plaintiff-respondent from his present employment as Deputy Sales Manager till the disposal of the application for temporary injunction. By the order under challenge in this appeal, the learned Judge, 5th Bench, of the City Civil Court at Calcutta granted an ex parte ad interim order of injunction restraining the Company-appellant from terminating the service of the plaintiff-respondent as Deputy Sales Manager, till disposal of the application for temporary injunction.

3. Feeling aggrieved by the grant of ad interim order of injunction, the Company-appellant has come up to this Court in appeal.

4. Before us two questions are raised on behalf of the Company-appellant against the aforesaid order under challenge in this appeal, the first ground of attack is that before granting ex parte injunction, the learned Judge ought to have recorded the reasons that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay if such ex parte injunction is not granted in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the second ground is that in view of the admitted fact that the relationship between the plaintiff and the Company was that of an employee and employee of personal nature, the suit itself with the prayer for injunction cannot be said to be maintainable in view of Ss. 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, the question of grant of injunction in a suit of this nature cannot arise at all.

5. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent however, contests the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant company.

6. After hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and after going through the materials on record, including the plaint and the application for injunction, we are, however, of the view that the learned Judge erred in passing the order under challenge in this appeal. The reasons are as follows: So far as the grant of ad interim order of injunction is concerned, it is now well settled that before granting an ex parte ad intaim order of injunction, it is the duty of the Court to record the reasons that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay if such ex parte injunction is not granted to the plaintiff. In the case reported in 1993 (3) SCC 161 (Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municlpal Corporation of Delhi & Ors.), the Supreme Court has observed at page 177 in paragraph 35 as under:

"As such whenever a court considers it neces