A dying declaration is admissible in evidence under section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872, if it is made by a person who is in a fit state of mind to make it and who has a settled hopeless expectation of death. A dying declaration should be corroborated by other evidence before it can be used to convict an accused person. A conviction based solely on a dying declaration is unsafe if there is no independent evidence to corroborate it.

Barin Ghosh, J.: I had the privilege of reading the well reasoned/judgment written by my Learned brother, Justice Asim Kumar Banerjee. I agree in toto with what my Learned brother has held and I affirm the same. However, I felt that I should also add a few words and hence this effort.

2. In the instant case the statement of the victim said to have recorded by the Executive Magistrate acts in two ways, first as a F.I.R and then as a dying declaration. Treating the same as a F.I.R., investigations have been made and in course thereof evidences have been collected and the same have been sought to be proved at the trial. The informations contained in the F.I.R. supply three distinct informations i.e. refusal on the part of the victim to pay a sum of Rs. 5000/- to the accused; burning by the accused of the victim; and bitting of the victim by the accused after the burning. The investigation could not also collect any evidence to support the third allegation. The investigation, however, collected some evidence in support of the second allegation. The third evidence so collected in the injury report prepared by the attending Doctor at the Primary Health Centre, who attended the victim at about 4.15 P.M. on the date of incident. That report apart from recording statements giving an impression that the victim was at that time in disposable-mind, recorded the following:

"alleges to have been burnt by her husband, Hari Charan resident of Port Mout on 16.11.97 at 2 P.M."

3. In addition to that, evidence in the oral form, said to have been made before the Investigating Officer by certain persons, were obtained and of such persons a few had been examined at the trial. The Doctor concerned who was examined at the trial supplied the words "the patient" before the sentence extracted above during her examination at the trial. It was contended that a written document can be explained and the Doctor in fact explained the same while giving evidence. It is true that a written document can be explained by parol evidence, but in the name of giving explanation if a word, which is not there in the written document is sought to be supplied, that is not permissible. Even assuming the words "the patient" could be supplied, then the evidence of the Doctor is to the effect that the patient had told the Doctor that her husband caused the burn. This piece of evidence has to be weighed with the other evidences available and the probative value of this piece of evidence has to be weighed in the light of evidence that has come on record. As my Learned brother has pointed out, while the Doctor at the Primary Health Centre, the mother and the brother of the accused deposed during the trial that the victim told them that she was burnt by her husband, two sons of the victim, the neighbour of the victim, to whom refuge was sought by the victim immediately after the incident, as well as the Taxi Driver, who took the victim to the Primary Health Centre, said otherwise. It has not been proved in evidence that either the Taxi Driver or the neighbour or the Doctors were anyway dependent either upon the accused or upon the parental family of the victim. As pointed out by my learned brother very little weightage could be given to these statements to make a conviction. Some of these statements could be taken into account as part of circumstantial evidence provided the circumstances could be established. As has been pointed out by my Learned brother the fact that the husband was present when the incident occurred has not been established. It has been correctly pointed out by my Learned brother that merely because the husband did not act in the fashion, the learned Sessions Judge though he should have acted, do not establish the circumstances leading to any inference upon which these conflicting statements given by these six witnesses could be weighed in such a manner so a to convict the accused. The logical conclusion therefore, would be that the evidence collected durin