Amendment of a plaint to add the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation in a suit for eviction is allowable after three years from the date of purchase, when the requirement arises during the pendency of the case.

Plaintiffs filed T. S. no. 137 of 1984 on 4.4.84 in the 2nd Court of Munsif at Alipore for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises. on several grounds. They did not plea the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation in the plaint as originally stood.

2. The mother of the plaintiff, purchased the property on 23.9.81. The suit for eviction was filed within three years from the date of purchase. The plaintiffs filed the amendment petition on 17.3.88 to and an additional ground for eviction, viz, reasonable requirement for own use and occupation.

3 The Court by impugned order no. 59 dated 1.7.88 had allowed the amendment.

4 Sub-section (3A) of s. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act hereinafter called the Act bars institution of a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation within three years from the date of purchase. The instant suit was filed within three years without pleading the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation. The ground was subsequently sought to be incorporated by amendment on 17.3.88. The amendment is sought for more than six years after the purchase of the property. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that despite amendment long after three years since after purchase the mischief under sub-so (3A) of S. 13 of the Act shall be attracted. In this connection reliance has been placed upon the Bench decision in Sudha Mukherjee v. Sankar Chatterjee (86 CWN 841) which has been followed in a later decision in Inder Sengupta V. Provarant Chakrararti 188 CWN 379).

5. In Sudha Mukherjee's Case (ante) the learned Judges found that the amendment sought for in the case was not bona fide. The reason that struck the learned Judges was that the landlord stood in need of the disputed accommodation for her own use since before the institution of suit and sued for eviction on untenable grounds. While three years had passed amendment was sought for in order to circumvent the bar under sub-s. (3A) of S. 13. Thus this amendment was found to be mala fide. Two considerations very heavily weighed with the learned Judge; to disallow the amendment. They found that the landlady's requirement for her own use and occupation was there when suit was filed. Suit was filed on untenable grounds and the bar under sub-s. 3A of s. 13 was sought to be circumvented by amendment of the plaint three years after purchase to incorporate the ground of reasonable requirement for her own use and occupation. Such circumvention was impermissible in law. Second consideration was that the amendment would relate back to the date of the institution of the suit. So if bar under sub-s. 3A of S. 13 of the Act would operate on that date amendment cannot be allowed.

6 Bar under S. 13 (3A) of the Act was intended to operate against the institution of suit for a particular period after purchases. Nevertheless it cannot prevent a second suit on a different cause of action. So in order to prevent multiplicity of proceeding and shorten litigation the amendment cannot be rejected. The argument on behalf of the landlady that the court will take notice of subsequent facts or events in order to shorten litigation and to do complete justice to the parties failed to carry the learned Judges. Their Lordships overruled the argument on the ground that the requirement of the landlady was not a subsequent event and that as a matter of fact she stood in need of the accommodation from the date of the suit.

7. But their Lordships did not question the theory propounded by the counsel for the landlady. By a long line of decisions the theory has crystalized into law. In Sikharchand Jain v. Digambar Jain Proband Karini Sabha (AIR 1974 SC 1178) Supreme Court held that ordinarily a suit is tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of the institution. But it is open to a court (including a court of appeal) to take notice of events which have happened after the inst