SEN Actg., C.J.—This is a reference to the Division Bench for reconsideration of the correctness of the decisions of Jagat Narayan J., in Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Padam Kumar Kothari(l) and reiterated by him in Kedarnath vs. Pana Devi (2) holding that an application by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint seeking to introduce a new ground of eviction viz., on the ground of default based on clause (a) of sub section (1) of section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, cannot be allowed under section 153 or Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where such ground arises after the institution of a suit for the eviction of the defendant on one or more of the grounds set forth in section 13 (1) of the Act, inasmuch as that would be tantamount to allowing the plaintiff to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the suit.

2. The parties stand in the relationship of landlord and tenant. On 13-7-1972, the plaintiff brought the suit for eviction of the defendant under section 13 (l)(h) of the Act i.e. on the ground of his penonal necessity alleging that he requires the suit premises, which is a shop, reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation. On the date of the suit, the defendant was in arrears of rent, but the ground mentioned in clause (a) thereof was not available to the plaintiff, inasmuch as he was not in arrears with the rent for a period of six months. The defendant filed his written statement contesting the plaintiffs claim and pleaded that the alleged necessity was not the bona fide requirement, but was just a pretence to secure his eviction. But before the suit could be fixed for evidence, the plaintiff on 2-4-1976 i.e. after about 4 years of the institution of the suit, made an application under Order 6 Rule 17 seeking to amend the plaint with a view to incorporate an additional ground under section 13 (l)(a), alleging that the defendant had neither paid, nor tendered the amount of rent for more than 6 months. That application of his has been allowed by the learned trial Judge by the order in revision. At the hearing, it was urged that the learned trial Judge was bound to follow the decisions of Jagat Narayan J., in Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Padam Kumar Kothari, (supra.) and Kedarnath vs. Panadevi supra, holding that no such amendment can be allowed. After hearing the parties at length, I felt that these decisions require reconsideration and, therefore, the matter has been placed before a larger Bench.

3. The decisions of Jagat Narayan J., in Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Padam Kumar Kothari, (supra) and Kedarnath vs. Panadevi (supra) proceed on the assumption that the existence of one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 13 (1) of the Act, constitutes a necessary part of the cause of action for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation and, therefore, where such a ground comes into existence after the institution of a suit on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 13 (1) of the Act, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to amend the plaint to introduce such a ground.

4. The learned Judge was of the view that the Court has no power either under section 153 or under Order 6 Rule 17 to allow an amendment of the plaintiff so as to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the suit. In reaching that conclusion, the learned Single Judge has relied upon the decisions of Privy Council in Mashwe Mya vs. Maung Mo Hnaung (3), Doorga Prasad vs. The Secretary of State (4) and Kanda vs. Waghu (5).

5. With due deference to the learned Judge, we are constrained to observe that his decision proceeds on a complete misreading of the decisions in Ma Shwe Mya vs. Maung Mo Hnaung, (supra) Doorga Prasad vs. The Secretary of State,(supra), and Kanda vs. Waghu, supra. He proceeds on a wrong premise in assuming that the incorporation of a new ground for eviction in a suit brought by the landlord under section 13 (1) of the Act due to subsequent events, canno

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