The scope of second appeal under s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been narrowed down by the Amendment Act of 1976, and a second appeal will lie only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

A.M. Bhattacharjee, J. –– A landlord, himself residing in a rented premises, has filed two suits against two of his tenants for the recovery of possession of the two premises occupied by them, each tenant occupying one floor of the three-storied premises owned by the landlord. The case of the landlord is that he reasonably requires both the premises for his own occupation and the occupation of the members of his household and that the rented premises occupied by him is both insufficient and unsuitable for his requirement. Both the Courts below having concurrently held in favour of the landlord and having decreed both the suits on such finding, the tenants-defendants have preferred these two second appeals, which have been heard together and are now being disposed of by this judgement.

2. As we have pointed out in some earlier cases, including that of A.K. Mukherji v. Prodip Ranjan Sarbodhikary (1987-2 Calcutta Law Journal 229 at 234), while the purpose of requirement by the landlord may involve a question of law, the extent of his requirement would, by and large, be a question of fact. Under s. 13(I)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, if a landlord is the owner of the tenanted premises, his reasonable requirement to furnish a ground of ejectment must be a requirement “for his own occupation”. Whether the avowed requirement of the land-lord would, in law, amount to a requirement “for his own occupation” may involve a question of law. But once such a requirement is, in law held to be a requirement “for his own occupation” the extent of accommodation reasonably required to satisfy such requirement would be a question of fact.

3. As a result of the decision of the two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhelal (AIR 1974 SC 1956 (at 7601-1602), an impression has gained ground that in view of the four Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Sarvate T.B v. Nemichand (1966 Madhya Pradesh Law journal 26), it must be taken to be settled law that finding as to the landlord’s reasonable requirement of the tenanted premises is a finding of fact and that the decision of the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Kamla Soni v Rup Lal Mehra (1970 Rent Control Journal 34) to the effect that such a finding is a mixed question of law and fact, is no longer good law being per incuriam of Sarvate T.B (supra) and also on principle. The impression, in our view, is erroneous. It is true that there are some observations in Sarvate T.B (supra) as well as in Muttulal (supra), which if consider ed divorced from the context, may lend some assurance to such an impression. But it should be noted that even while following Sarvate T.B. (supra) and holding Kamla Soni (supra) not to have laid down good law in view of the larger Bench decision in Sarvate T.B. (supra), it has nevertheless been laid down in Mattulal (supra), at 1601 that a finding as to the landlord’s reasonable requirement or the tenanted premises would be assailable in second appeal if the same has been arrived at on an erroneous application of law, thereby clearly implying that in a given case a finding as to reasonable requirement may very well involve a question of law Mattulal (supra) has clearly laid down that finding as to the reasonable requirement can be assailed in second appeal only if there is an error of law in arriving at such finding or if the finding is based on no evidence at all or is such that no reasonable person can arrive at it on the materials on record. As would be shown hereafter, these two appeals would fail by these tests.

4. In the cases at hand, the requirement put forward by the landlord is for the purpose of occupation for the residence of himself and his wife, of his daughter and son-in-law and two or their children and also for carrying on medical prefession by the landlord himself and his son-in-law. It has been found by both the Courts below that the daughter is the only child of the plaintiff-landlord and his wife and that