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1980 Supreme(Cal) 229

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Bimal Chandra Basak, J.
Elgin Properties & Ors.
Vs.
State of West Bengal & Ors.
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction No. 1439 of 1980
Decided On : June 18, 1980

Advocates Appeared:
A. Mitra for the petitioner ;
S.K. Acharyya, Advocate Genneral for the State
A.P. Chatterjee for the respondent no. 7

Headnote:

The Court held that the order of requisition passed by the State Government for the continued employment of workers of a private company was a valid exercise of power under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 (the Act). The Court found that the purpose of the requisition was a public purpose, as it aimed to prevent unemployment and ensure the continuity of employment for a large number of workers. The Court also held that the order was not vague, as it clearly specified the premises to be requisitioned and the purpose of the requisition. The Court further held that the non-service of the order on the petitioner, who was the owner of the premises, did not invalidate the order, as the requisition had been served on the Official Trustee, who was the legal owner of the premises. The Court also held that the order was not mala fide, as it was not made to set at nought the decree obtained by the petitioners or to circumvent the orders passed by different courts, including the Supreme Court. The Court also held that the State Government was not prevented from exercising its power of requisition merely because there was a decree for possession in favor of a third person or merely because that decree had been put in for execution.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners, owners of a property in Kolkata, challenged an order of requisition passed by the State Government under the Act. The order requisitioned a portion of the petitioners' property for the purpose of allowing a private company, Caxton & Co., to continue its operations. The petitioners contended that the order was invalid on several grounds, including that it was not for a public purpose, that it was vague, that it was not served on the petitioners, that it was mala fide, and that it was made to circumvent a decree obtained by the petitioners.

Finding of the Court:

The Court found that the order of requisition was valid and dismissed the petition. The Court held that the purpose of the requisition was a public purpose, as it aimed to prevent unemployment and ensure the continuity of employment for a large number of workers. The Court also held that the order was not vague, as it clearly specified the premises to be requisitioned and the purpose of the requisition. The Court further held that the non-service of the order on the petitioner, who was the owner of the premises, did not invalidate the order, as the requisition had been served on the Official Trustee, who was the legal owner of the premises. The Court also held that the order was not mala fide, as it was not made to set at nought the decree obtained by the petitioners or to circumvent the orders passed by different courts, including the Supreme Court.

Issues: 1. Whether the order of requisition was for a public purpose. 2. Whether the order was vague. 3. Whether the order was served on the petitioners. 4. Whether the order was mala fide. 5. Whether the order was made to circumvent a decree obtained by the petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The purpose of the requisition was a public purpose, as it aimed to prevent unemployment and ensure the continuity of employment for a large number of workers. 2. The order was not vague, as it clearly specified the premises to be requisitioned and the purpose of the requisition. 3. The non-service of the order on the petitioner, who was the owner of the premises, did not invalidate the order, as the requisition had been served on the Official Trustee, who was the legal owner of the premises. 4. The order was not mala fide, as it was not made to set at nought the decree obtained by the petitioners or to circumvent the orders passed by different courts, including the Supreme Court.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition and upheld the order of requisition passed by the State Government.

ORDER

In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners are challenging an order of requisition bearing no.13/80 Reqn. dated 17th April, 1980 issued by the State of West Bengal in exercise of powers conferred by sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act).

The facts of this case, as would appear from the petition, are as follows : –


2. The petitioner no. 1, Elgin Properties, is a partnership firm and the petitioner no. 2 is one of the partners of the said firm. The Official Trustee for West Bengal, the respondent no. 6 herein, is the trustee to the Trust of D.A. David for Davidian Girls’ School by and under a Deed of Trust dated 28th September, 1974 and is the legal owner of the premises no. 1-B, Ashutosh Mukherjee Road, (hereinafter referred to as the said premises). The petitioner carry on business of development of real property.

3. By and under a registered deed of lease dated September 28, 1974 the respondent no. 6 demised the said premises in favour of the petitioner for a term of 21 years commencing from 1st May 1969 with on option on the part of the petitioners to renew the lease for another period of 21 years. The said deed of lease was granted in favour of the petitioners by the Official Trustee with the leave of this Hon’ble Court. It is alleged that the said lease was obtained by the petitioners for the purpose of developing the said property and that the said deed of lease expressly authorised the petitioners to build at their own cost upper storey or storeys on the existing building or to construct a new building. The building at the said premises is a two storeyed building with outhouses. At the time of grant of the said lease a portion of the ground floor of the said premises was occupied by CAXTON & Co., the respondent no. 7 herein. Two rooms on the ground floor of the said premises is partly occupied by Martin & Harris Ltd. The remaining portion of the said premises is comprised of bathrooms, lavatories, urinals, common passages, common lobby which has been in use for all the occupiers of the said premises. The staircases leading to the first floor-begin from the ground floor. There is no access to the first floor of the said premises except through the ground floor. After obtaining the said lease, the petitioners, it is alleged got vacant possession of the first floor and also of terrace above the first floor. The Durwan and Security guards engaged by the petitioner for looking after the said premises and they have been provided accommodation on the terrace of the said premises and they have been using the lavatories and urinals on the ground floor of the said premises. It is alleged that the petitioners obtained possession of the leasehold premises in 1972 pursuant to one agreement of lease.

4. The respondent no. 9, Caxton Employees Union, is a registered trade Union. The said Trade Union claims to represent the workers and employees of the said Caxton & Co, the respondent no. 7 herein. It is alleged that the said Caxton Employees Union is affiliated with Centre of Indian Trade Unions which is a Federation of Trade Unions of Communist Party of India (Marxist).

5. It is alleged that the respondent no. 7 did not have any tenancy right in respect of the said premises. After obtaining the lease the petitioners took steps for eviction of the respondent no. 7 from the said premises and thereafter the following proceedings filed a suit being Suit no. 111 of 1972 against the respondent no. 7 for eviction and possession in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Alipore. The said suit was contested by the respondent no. 7 and on March 13, 1976 a decree for eviction of respondent no. 7 was passed by the learned Judge of Alipore on contest.

6. Against the said decree the respondent no. 7 preferred an appeal before this Hon’ble Court. Appellate Side being Appeal no. 367 of 1976. On March 8, 1979 the A









































































































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