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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Anil Kumar Sen and Bankim Chandra Ray, JJ.
Ayubali Sardar & another - Appellants
Versus
Derajuddin Mallick & Ors. – Respondents
Letters Patent Appeal No. 50 of 1974
Decided on : September 26, 1975
WEST BENGAL ESTATES ACQUISITION ACT, 1954 - SECTION 57B(2) - SUIT FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION - BAR OF JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT - APPLICABILITY - SCOPE OF ENQUIRY AND ADJUDICATION IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 44(2A) AND 44(3) - CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECISION OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 44(3) - LIMITATION - ARTICLE 142 AND 144 OF THE OLD LIMITATION ACT - ADMISSION OF DISPOSSESSION - POSSESSION BY PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT OR HIS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST AND THEIR RIGHT TO POSSESS NOT IN DISPUTE - PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION WITH RIGHTFUL OWNER - REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTION.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff purchased the suit land from three ladies who were admittedly the owners. He went into possession and was paying rent to the State of West Bengal as the superior interest vested in the State under the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954. One Pran Krishna Das and some of his co-sharers filed an objection under section 44(1) of the said Act to the record so prepared in favour of the ladies claiming a goola tenancy (tenancy on payment of rent in kind) but this objection failed on merits. Pran Krishna instituted Title suit No. 343 of 1958 in the local civil court for establishing his claim of tenancy and therein prayed for an injunction to protect his alleged claim of possession. Such a prayer for injunction was concurrently overruled both by the trial court and the appellate court upon a clear finding that the plaintiff therein (Pran Krishna) had neither any prima facie title nor possession of the suit land. That suit was thereafter allowed to be dismissed for default by Pran Krishna who then effected a collusive transfer on September 24, 1962 in favour of the defendants. The defendants, however, could not get any possession on such transfer and one of them defendant No.5 executed a Nadabi on March 27, 1963 in favour of the transferor, Pran Krishna, dearly admitting therein that it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the suit land. According to the plaintiff-respondent notwithstanding the aforesaid position, the defendants having threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land he had to institute a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein however, an order adverse as against the plaintiff having been passed on October 21, 1963, he had to institute the present suit as by the said order the defendants have been adjudged to be in possession and there had been a prohibitory order on the plaintiff-respondent not to disturb such possession of the defendants.
Finding of the Court:
1. Section 57B(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954 does not bar a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession based on an independent cause of action, even if the suit land is recorded in the name of the defendants in the record of rights prepared under Chapter V of the Act, as long as the plaintiff is prepared to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to such entries. 2. The scope of enquiry and adjudication in proceedings under section 44(2A) and 44(3) of the Act is limited to the determination of questions of possession on the basis of summary evidence, and does not extend to the determination of questions of title. 3. The decision of the appellate tribunal under section 44(3) is not conclusive and binding on the parties so as to bar a subsequent suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, as the appellate tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the decision of the officer specially empowered under section 44(2A) and does not confer any wider powers to decide questions of title finally. 4. In a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, where the plaintiff admits dispossession and seeks relief on the basis of an adverse order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 142 of the old Limitation Act applies, and the suit must be filed within 3 years from the date of the order. 5. However, where the plaintiff does not admit dispossession and the defendants claim possession under a tenancy right, Article 144 of the old Limitation Act applies, and the suit must be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession.
Issues: 1. Whether Section 57B(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954 bars a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession based on an independent cause of action? 2. What is the scope of enquiry and adjudication in proceedings under section 44(2A) and 44(3) of the Act? 3. Whether the decision of the appellate tribunal under section 44(3) is conclusive and binding on the parties so as to bar a subsequent suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession? 4. Which Article of the old Limitation Act applies to a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, where the plaintiff admits dispossession and seeks relief on the basis of an adverse order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 5. Which Article of the old Limitation Act applies to a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, where the plaintiff does not admit dispossession and the defendants claim possession under a tenancy right?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 57B(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954 does not bar a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession based on an independent cause of action, even if the suit land is recorded in the name of the defendants in the record of rights prepared under Chapter V of the Act, as long as the plaintiff is prepared to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to such entries. 2. The scope of enquiry and adjudication in proceedings under section 44(2A) and 44(3) of the Act is limited to the determination of questions of possession on the basis of summary evidence, and does not extend to the determination of questions of title. 3. The decision of the appellate tribunal under section 44(3) is not conclusive and binding on the parties so as to bar a subsequent suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, as the appellate tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the decision of the officer specially empowered under section 44(2A) and does not confer any wider powers to decide questions of title finally. 4. In a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, where the plaintiff admits dispossession and seeks relief on the basis of an adverse order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 142 of the old Limitation Act applies, and the suit must be filed within 3 years from the date of the order. 5. However, where the plaintiff does not admit dispossession and the defendants claim possession under a tenancy right, Article 144 of the old Limitation Act applies, and the suit must be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession.
Final Decision: The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
The suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession is not barred by Section 57B(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954, even if the land is recorded in the name of the defendants in the record of rights, provided the plaintiff can rebut the presumption of correctness attached to such entries (!) (!) .
The scope of enquiry and adjudication in proceedings under sections 44(2A) and 44(3) of the Act is limited to questions of possession based on summary evidence. These proceedings do not extend to the determination of questions of title, and the decision of the appellate tribunal under section 44(3) is not conclusive or binding to bar subsequent suits for declaration of title and possession (!) (!) .
The decision of the appellate tribunal under section 44(3) does not have the finality or binding effect that would bar a suit for declaration of title, as the scope of that tribunal's jurisdiction is limited and does not include a final adjudication of questions of ownership or title (!) .
In suits where the plaintiff admits dispossession and seeks relief based on an adverse order in proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Article 142 of the old Limitation Act applies, and the suit must be filed within three years from the date of the order (!) (!) .
Conversely, if the plaintiff does not admit dispossession and the defendants claim possession under a tenancy right, Article 144 of the old Limitation Act applies, and the suit must be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession, provided the plaintiff can establish possession within that period (!) (!) .
The evidence, including documentary proof such as rent receipts and admissions by co-sharers, supports the assertion that the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest were continuously in possession of the land until the adverse order in the criminal proceedings, which temporarily dispossessed him (!) (!) .
The alleged settlement or tenancy claims by the defendants, supported by documents like a unilateral Kabuliat and rent receipts, are not conclusively proved, especially given the lack of acceptance by the landowners and inconsistencies in the evidence. Such evidence alone does not establish a valid settlement or tenancy (!) (!) (!) .
The adverse order under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was relied upon by the defendants as proof of dispossession, does not conclusively prove dispossession for the purposes of limitation, as the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence indicate his continuous possession and ownership rights (!) (!) .
The appeal was ultimately dismissed, affirming that the suit was properly filed within the applicable limitation period and that the evidence supported the plaintiff’s claim of ownership and possession, despite the adverse criminal order (!) .
The legal provisions regarding the preparation of records of rights and the limits of civil court jurisdiction confirm that entries in such records are only evidentiary and do not determine ownership, allowing parties to institute independent suits to establish their rights (!) (!) .
These points collectively clarify the legal principles applied, emphasizing that proceedings under the relevant land records law do not bar suits for title, and that the limitation period depends on the nature of the claim and the evidence of possession.
Sen J. :- This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is on a certificate granted by S. K. Datta, J. a learned Single Judge of this Court and is directed against the judgment and decree dated January 22, 1973, passed by him in Second Appeal No. 182 of 1968. By the judgment now under appeal the learned Judge reversed the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court and restored those passed by the trial court.
2. This appeal is by defendants 3 and 4 and it arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession after evicting the defendants from the suit land and for meane profits. The suit land is one 2.39 decimals of land out of 4.78 acres of present Dag No. 154, Khatian 71 which corresponds to old Dag No. 147 and Khatian 42 of Mouza Paschim Raghunathpur, Police Station Jaynagar, District-24 Parganas. There is no dispute that this land once belonged to three ladies, namely, (i) Sm. Annapurna Debi, (ii) Sm. Sailabala Debi and (iii) Sm. Sumatibala Debi. According to the plaintiff-respondent this land was held in khas by the said ladies and was recorded as such in the finally published records of rights prepared under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The plaintiff purchased this land from the ladies on April 18, 1960, and went into possession. He was cultivating the land and was paying rent to the State of West Bengal as the superior interest vested in the State under the provisions of the said Act. One Pran Krisna Das and some of his co-sharers filed an objection under section 44 (1) of the said Act to the record so prepared in favour of the ladies claiming a goola tenancy (tenancy on payment of rent in kind) but this objection failed on merits. Pran Krisna instituted Title suit No. 343 of 1958 in the local civil court for establishing his claim of tenancy and therein prayed for an injunction to protect his alleged claim of possession. Such a prayer for injunction was concurrently overruled both by the trial court and the appellate court upon a clear finding that the plaintiff therein (Pran Krishna) had neither any prima facie title nor possession of the suit land. That suit was thereafter allowed to be dismissed for default by Pran Krishna who then effected a collusive transfer on September 24, 1962 in favour of the defendants. The defendants, however, could not get any possession on such transfer and one of them defendant No.5 executed a Nadabi on March 27, 1963 in favour of the transferor, Pran Krishna, dearly admitting therein that it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the suit land. According to the plaintiff-respondent notwithstanding the aforesaid position, the defendants having threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land he had to institute a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein however, an order adverse as against the plaintiff having been passed on October 21, 1963, he had to institute the present suit as by the said order the defendants have been adjudged to be in possession and there had been a prohibitory order on the plaintiff-respondent not to disturb such possession of the defendants.
3. This suit was contested by defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 who filed written statement. They denied that the suit land was in the khas possession of the ladies or that it was recorded as such in the finally published record of right. They claimed that one Annada Das, predecessor-in-interest of Pran Krishna Das and others was a Goola tenant under the ladies in respect of the suit land which was not initially recorded in the records of rights through an error but on an objection under section 44(2A) such a tenancy was duly recorded in the finally published record of rights. An appeal against the said decision in the proceeding under Section 44 (2A) by Annapurna Debi and others failed. Pran Krishna Das and others being thus in possession had validly effected a transfer in favour of the defendan
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