IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Soumen Sen, J.
Smt. Mita Sen - Petitioner
Versus
State of West Bengal and Others – Respondents
W.P. No. 38 of 2013
Decided on : 4-3-2014
An order passed under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is recoverable under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - SECTION 33C(2) - SECTION 15(2)(B) - ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 15(2)(B) IS RECOVERABLE UNDER SECTION 33C(2) - ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 15(2)(B) IS ENFORCEABLE - WORD "BENEFIT" IN SECTION 33C(2) IS OF WIDE IMPORT AND INCLUDES INTERIM RELIEF DETERMINED UNDER SECTION 15(2)(B) - WORKMAN CAN INITIATE PROCEEDING UNDER SECTION 33C(2) TO RECOVER SUCH AMOUNT.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an employee, filed an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking a direction upon the company to compute the amount in terms of the order passed under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act along with other statutory benefits to which the petitioner is entitled to under the said order. The Tribunal refused to pass any order on the ground that the order passed under Section 15(2)(b) is not an award which is capable of being executed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the order passed under Section 15(2)(b) is recoverable under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The word "benefit" in Section 33C(2) is of wide import and includes interim relief determined under Section 15(2)(b). The workman can initiate a proceeding under Section 33C(2) to recover such amount.
Issues: Whether the order passed under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is recoverable under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court relied on the following principles: 1. The word "benefit" in Section 33C(2) is of wide import and includes interim relief determined under Section 15(2)(b). 2. The workman can initiate a proceeding under Section 33C(2) to recover such amount.
Final Decision: The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the Labour Court to dispose of the application under Section 33C(2) within four weeks from the date of communication of this order.
Soumen Sen, J.
1. The order of the presiding Judge, 1st Labour Court in refusing to pass any order in an application filed by the petitioner under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. The said relief was refused on the ground that the order passed under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not an award which is capable of being executed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. It appears from the record that the learned Judge of the 3rd Industrial Tribunal in an application filed by the petitioner under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has awarded interim relief in favour of the petitioner by reason of failure on the part of the employer, namely, the respondent No. 3 to pay the amounts in terms of the said order. The petitioner filed an application under Section 33C(2) seeking a direction upon the company to compute the amount in terms of the order passed under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act along with other statutory benefits to which the petitioner is entitled to under the said order.
3. The only objection taken by the company seems to be that the order passed is in the nature of interim relief and not an award which is capable of being executed in a proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner is not having any existing right nor any right is arising out of an award which can be enforced in a proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
4. Mr. Soumya Majumdar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the said order was passed by the learned Tribunal completely in remiss of the disjunctive clause 'or' referred to in 33C(2).
5. It is submitted that the proceeding under Section 33C(2) is more wide than a proceeding under Section 33C(1) and in a proceeding under Section 33C(2), the tribunal has a jurisdiction to determine whether the workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The expression "any benefit", according to the learned Counsel, has been lost sight of by the Tribunal while deciding the said application. The Tribunal has only confined its enquiry and attention to Section 33C(1) and has disregarded Section 33C(2).
6. The Tribunal on the basis of the evidence and the decision cited before it held that since there is no scope for computation of any amount as there is no dispute regarding the quantum of money to be paid by the applicant and the period for which it is to be paid, there is no scope to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal has taken into consideration a decision of the Calcutta High Court passed in W.P. No. 145 of 2000, M/s. Lytton Hotel v. State of West Bengal & Ors. in which it was held that the determination of an interim relief under Section 15(2)(b) is neither enforceable nor does it have any compulsive character and, therefore, such determination of interim relief under Section 15(2)(b) is not recoverable as the land revenue. The Hon'ble Court seems to have further observed that if, however, the employer considers that it has a strong case, it might well-choose not to pay any amount determined under Section 15(2)(b) as the employee would be faced with the problem of recovering the amount, in the event, ultimately the said employer succeeds.
7. In Debabrata Sen v. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in 1998 (2) CHN 556 a learned Single Judge while considering the enforceability of an order passed under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (West Bengal Amendment) held that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be powerless to issue a mandate upon the employer even if the said employer is not an authority or State within the meaning of Article 12 of th