Section 151 of the CrPC, which allows for amendments in criminal proceedings, can be applied to maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of the CrPC, as they are quasi-criminal in nature and akin to civil proceedings.

Sudip Ahluwalia, J.

The petitioner in this case is the husband of the Opposite Party No. 2. An application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. was filed against him in the Court of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar, North 24-Parganas. During the course of those proceedings the Opposite Party wife filed an application for amendment of her original maintenance petition, which was allowed by the Learned Trial Court on 20.08.2014. The petitioner preferred revision against such order. But his Revisional Application No. 216 of 2014 was dismissed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 6th Court at Barasat, and the order of the Learned ACJM was upheld. He has now approached this Court to challenge the same.

2. His contention is that there is no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure for permitting amendments in the pleadings in the form of applications or replies before the concerned Court.

3. To support this contention, it has been stressed on behalf of the petitioner that in the absence of an appropriate provision within the codified law, it is not open for the Courts to transgress beyond the Statute for granting any such relief to a party, which is not covered within the Statute as, in such event, the Court would essentially be intruding into the Legislative domain.

4. He has placed before this Court the Judgment of the Supreme Court in "State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram" reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280. In para 23 of the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court had noted:-

"23. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., S.R. Das, J. state: (AIR p.381, para 6)

"6.....The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation......"

5. In "Eerati Laxman v. State of Andhra Pradesh" reported in (2009)3 SCC 337 it was held in relation to the Juvenile Justice Act:-

".......11. In our opinion, the High Court is not entirely correct in arriving at the said conclusion. The said Act is a beneficent legislation. It, however, would not mean that the principle of literal interpretation thereof should not be resorted to....."

6. Again in "Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust and Other v. A.G. Syed Mohideen and Others" reported in (2010)2 SCC 513 it was held-

".....11. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the legislature or the lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation toolkit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be ....."

(Emphasis added).

7. The petitioner has also cited extracts from the Written opinion of Lord Diplock given in "Duport Steels Ltd and oth