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2017 Supreme(Cal) 904

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Arijit Banerjee, J.
Keshaw Prasad - Appellant
Vs.
State of West Bengal and Ors. - Respondents
WP 307 of 2017
Decided On : 08-09-2017

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Anjan Bhattacharya
For the Respondents: Sirsanya Bandyopadhyay

The discretionary power under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not exercised to assist the tardy and indolent, but in compelling cases, the High Court may grant relief despite delay.

Headnote:

Appointment - Approval of Services - School Education - [West Bengal School Education Act, 1996, Section 15(1)(a), Section 15(1)(b)] - The court discussed the petitioner's appointment in a D.A. getting School and the approval of his services. The court highlighted the provisions of the West Bengal School Education Act, 1996, specifically Section 15(1)(a) and Section 15(1)(b), which were relevant to the approval of the petitioner's appointment and influenced the court's decision to set aside the impugned order and refer the petitioner's case for fresh adjudication.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner sought approval of his appointment in a D.A. getting School. The respondent No. 3 issued a memo stating that he had no authority to approve the appointment, leading to the petitioner approaching the Court. The State resisted the petitioner's prayer based on the delay in filing the writ petition.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the impugned order was liable to be set aside as the respondent No. 3 did not decide the petitioner's claim as directed. The court also considered the delay in filing the writ petition and the reasons provided by the petitioner for the delay.

Issues: The issues involved the approval of the petitioner's appointment and the delay in filing the writ petition.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the petitioner deserved an opportunity to have his claim decided by a competent authority. The court also considered the reasons for the delay in filing the writ petition and exercised its discretion to grant relief to the petitioner.

Final Decision: The court set aside the impugned order and referred the petitioner's case to the respondent No. 2 for fresh adjudication in accordance with the law and applicable rules/regulations/circulars/notifications.

JUDGMENT :

Arijit Banerjee, J.

1. The petitioner claims approval of his appointment in a D.A. getting School being Adarsh Hindi High School, Bhowanipur, Kolkata. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that he was appointed as an unapproved teacher on 3 March, 1979 in a permanent post which was then vacant. Learned Counsel drew my attention to a resolution of the ad hoc Committee of the School taken at a meeting held on 20 May, 2006 whereby, inter alia, the School authorities unanimously resolved to forward the necessary papers in connection with the approval of the services of eight teachers of the School including the petitioner to the District Inspector of Schools (PE), Kolkata, being the respondent No. 3, for approval. He submitted that such papers were duly forwarded to the respondent No. 3.

2. Since there was no response from the respondent No. 3, the petitioner approached this Court by filing WP 912 of 2007 which was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 25 July, 2007 directing the respondent No. 3 to take a reasoned decision in the matter. Pursuant to such order, the respondent No. 3 held a meeting which was attended by the petitioner and the Secretary of the said School. Subsequently, the respondent No. 3 issued a memo dated 14 December, 2007 which is under challenge in the present writ application.

3. Mr. Bhattacharya, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the said memo, the respondent No. 3 has recorded certain findings but at the end of the memo he has stated as follows:-

"As the District Inspector of Schools (PE) has no authority to approve the appointment of the petitioner, the undersigned cannot take any decision in the matter.

The matter is, thus, disposed of."

Learned Counsel submitted that the earlier order of this Court was passed in the presence of learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 and if the respondent No. 3 had no authority to take a decision in the matter, submission to that effect should have been made to the Court. The hearing held by the respondent No. 3 was an exercise in futility since at the end of the impugned memo he recorded that he has no authority to take any decision in the matter. Learned Counsel submitted that the matter should be referred to the Commissioner of School Education, Government of West Bengal for decision.

4. Mr. Bandopadhyay, learned Junior Standing Counsel representing the State respondents including the respondent No. 3 resisted the petitioner's prayer only on the ground of delay in filing the writ petition. He submitted that the impugned memo is of the year 2007. The petitioner has approached this Court after about 10 years. The Writ Court is a Court of equity and delay defeats equity. He submitted that this highly belated writ application should be dismissed in limine. In this connection, Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48. Learned Counsel relied on paragraph 14 of the reported judgment which reads as follows:-

"14. The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction, has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle, Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay defects equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to hi


















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