The main legal point established is the interpretation of Section 147 of the Railways Act for eviction and the requirement of due process for eviction from Railway property.

DEBANGSU BASAK, J.

1. The petitioner has assailed two notices, issued by the Railway Authorities, directing the petitioner to vacate a property of the Railways, occupied by the petitioner.

2. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, the father of the petitioner was a licensee of a Railway property. Subsequent to the death of the father of the petitioner, the petitioner was treated as a licensee in respect of same property. The father of the petitioner was running a sweet meat shop. Subsequent to the death of his father, the petitioner ran such sweet meat shop. Being aggrieved by the two notices issued for eviction, the petitioner had approached this Court by way of the present writ petition. An interim order dated September 23, 2015 was passed. However, after expiry of the interim order, the Railway Authorities have evicted the petitioner. The eviction is not in accordance with law. Due process for eviction has not been followed. The petitioner is to be treated as a tenant. The provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 have not been put into service for the purpose of evicting the petitioner. Section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989 cannot be utilised for the purpose of evicting the petitioner. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has relied upon (Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 620). He has submitted that, to vacate the petitioner, due process of law has to be followed. He has relied upon (East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank, (1992) Supp2 SCC 29) in support of such contention.

3. Without prejudice to his previous contentions, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that, even if, provisions of Section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989 are attracted, then also, principles of natural justice have to be adhered to by the Railway Authorities. In the present case, the Railways did not afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before evicting the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned actions of the Railways are vitiated by the breach of principles of natural justice. Principles of natural justice are to be read into a statute, when such statute, does not expressly oust its applicability. In support of such contentions, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has relied upon (S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., (1980) 4 SCC 379), (Basudeo Tiwari v. Sido Kanhu University & Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 194) and (Prakash Ratan Sinha v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2009) 14 SCC 690).

4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has referred to the two impugned notices dated September 4, 2014 and September 10, 2019 and submitted that, the decision of the Railways to evict the petitioner is bad in law. The business of the petitioner cannot be termed as illegal. In any event, the petitioner ought to have been afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing before such decision was taken.

5. Learned Advocate appearing for the Railways has submitted that, the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the present writ petition. There is no jural relationship between the petitioner and the Railways. The father of the petitioner was a licensee under the Railways. The father of the petitioner expired on October 31, 2005. The Railways had granted licence to the deceased father of the petitioner to run a business dealing with wagon-load and rail-borne traffic at plot no. 4 at Gobardanga Railway Station. The Railways never allowed the deceased father of the petitioner or the petitioner to run a sweet meat shop at such plot. The certificate obtained by the petitioner for running a sweet meat shop at a commercial plot under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1994 in no circumstances ratifies the illegal occupation of the petitioner at such plot. According to him, both the deceased father of the petitioner and the petitioner was conducting th