The limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 starts to run from the date on which a party to the arbitration agreement receives a signed copy of the arbitral award.

JUDGMENT :

Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.

1. This is an application for setting aside of an Award dated 30th September, 2021 passed by a learned sole Arbitrator. The ground taken for relief is that the Arbitrator was unilaterally appointed by the respondent.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/award-holder takes a point of maintainability of the application on the ground that the application has been filed beyond the prescribed limitation under Section 34(3) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with the proviso. According to counsel, while the Award is of 30th September, 2021, the present application has been filed on 10th April, 2023 which is way beyond the timelines prescribed under Section 34(3) read with the proviso.

3. The point of maintainability is required to be answered first.

4. Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act prescribes three months from the date of the award being received by the applicant for filing of an application for setting aside of the award. The proviso gives the applicant an additional window of thirty days on sufficient cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Court. The timelines under Section 34(3) and the proviso do not permit any further extension for filing of an application for setting aside of the award under Sections 34(1) and (2) of the Act.

5. Section 31(5) stipulates that a signed copy of the arbitral award shall be delivered to each party.

6. If Sections 34(3) and 31(5) are read together, the obvious construction would be that the limitation under Section 34(3) would start to run from the date on which a party receives a signed copy of the Award. Section 2(1)(h) defines a “Party” as a party to an arbitration agreement. Therefore, a further addition to the above construction would be that the limitation for filing an application for setting aside of an arbitral award would start to run from the day when a party to the arbitration agreement receives a signed copy of the arbitral award.

7. In the present case, the documents placed before the Court are required to be referred to in order to ascertain the starting point of the limitation for filing of the present application. The postal consignment track record annexed to the application shows that the item, i.e., the impugned award was booked from the Kolkata GPO on 30/10/2021. The item was redirected to Noapara, SO North 24-Paraganas on 3/11/2021. The item was thereafter returned to Kazipara, BO on 3/11/2021 as the addresee could not be located. The last entry in the track report shows “Item delivered [To : SHIVAJI (Addressee)]”. Shivaji is the name of the Sole Arbitrator - Shivaji Mitra - who passed the impugned Award.

8. It must be mentioned at this stage that none of the dates in the track report are visible and the Court had to take the assistance of learned counsel appearing for the parties to figure the actual dates.

9. Hence, as the matter stands and would be evident from the material disclosed, the impugned award was returned to the arbitrator since the petitioners/award-debtors could not be located.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/award-holder seeks to argue that the facts however would amount to deemed service on the petitioners/award-debtors. Counsel relies on Section 3 of the 1996 Act, Section 27 of The General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of The Evidence Act, 1872 in support of his argument.

11. Section 3 of the 1996 Act relates to receipt of written communications and contemplates a deeming fiction with regard to receipt of any written communication if it is delivered to the addressee personally or at its place of business or habitual residence or mailing address [Section (3)(1)(a)] or if the written communication sent to the addressee’s last known place of business, habitual residence or mailing address by registered letter or by other means which provides for a record of the attempt to deliver it after making a reasonable enquiry. [3(1)(b)]

12. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act defines service b