The judgment emphasizes the importance of witness testimonies, fingerprint evidence, and the recovery of physical evidence in establishing guilt. It also highlights the consideration of the victim's age and the nature of the crime in sentencing.

JUDGMENT :

(Debangsu Basak, J.) :

1. The judgement of conviction dated July 2, 2020 and the order of sentence dated July 6, 2020 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge-Cum-Special Judge, Kalna, Purba Burdwan in Sessions No. 47 of 2019 arising out of Sessions (Special) Case No. 17 of 2019 has caused the present Death Reference. By the impugned judgement of conviction dated July 2, 2020 and the order of sentence dated July 6, 2020, the Learned Trial Judge has convicted the appellant under Section 448, 376A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and has sentenced the appellant to death.

2. The police had sought trial of the appellant on the contention that the appellant committed trespass on May 30, 2019 at about 17:00 hours/ 17:30 hours by entering into the house of the de facto complainant, sexually assaulted and caused injuries to the victim, the minor daughter of the de facto complainant. The police had also claimed that the appellant committed rape upon the minor and while committing such offence the appellant inflicted injury on her which caused her death. The police had also contended that the appellant committed penetrative sexual assault on the minor, caused bodily injury to the sexual organ of the minor and also murdered the minor.

3. Charges as against the appellant under Sections 448/376A/302 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 had been framed on September 7, 2019.

4. The appellant had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. At the trial, the prosecution had examined 35 witnesses and relied upon various documentary and material evidences being Exhibit 1 to 56 and Material Exhibit I to X respectively. The appellant had been examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 where he denied all the allegations made by the prosecution by claiming that he was falsely implicated. He had not furnished any oral or documentary witness at the trial.

5. Mr. Arnab Chatterjee, Advocate, led by Mr. Sekhar Kr. Basu, Senior Advocate as amicus curiae has submitted that, the prosecution did not bring forth any eye witness to the incident at the trial. Referring to the oral testimonies of the prosecution witnesses it has been contended that, none of the prosecution witness had seen the appellant to either enter or exit the house of the victim. Therefore, it has been contended that, the prosecution did not bring on record any evidence to establish the complicity of the appellant in the incident.

6. Referring to the recovery of the so called murder weapon being the iron rod which was marked as Material Exhibit III on behalf of the prosecution, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that, such iron rod was readily available in the market. The prosecution has not brought forward any distinguishing feature of the iron rod to implicate the appellant therewith. The iron rod being Material Exhibit III had been recovered from a public place and that too after two months from the date of the incident. Reference has been made to the seizure list and it has been contended that, though the recovery was made from a public place there was no independent witness to the seizure list. According to the appellant therefore, the seizure was suspect and that no reliance should be placed thereon.

7. Referring to the Test Identification Parade, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that, the appellant was shown in the social media prior to the Test Identification Parade. Therefore, the veracity of the Test Identification Parade has been put into doubt. With regard to Test Identification Parade reliance has been placed on 2016 Volume 2 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 97 (Noorahammad and Others vs. State of Karnataka).

8. Referring to the fingerprint said to be that of the appellant at the place of occurrence, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that, pres