Disputes arising from a lease agreement containing an arbitration clause can be referred to arbitration even when a non-signatory is involved, provided the claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

JUDGMENT :

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya , J .

1. The present two appeals have been preferred against the same order. In FMAT 167 of 2025, the grant of injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 has been assailed whereas in FMA 816 of 2025, the rejection of an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by the defendant no. 1/appellant has been challenged under Section 37 of the 1996 Act.

2. The main premise on which the application under Section 8 was refused by the learned Trial Judge was that the defendant no. 2 was a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement and as such, the parameters of Section 8 are not satisfied.

3. Before the Trial Court, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 also took an objection to the effect that the original lease agreement containing the arbitration clause (Clause 28) was not produced.

4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant no. 1/appellant argues that the principal relief in the suit has been sought against the defendant no. 1. Moreover, the entire gamut of the reliefs sought in the suit revolves around the lease agreement containing the arbitration clause. Relief ‘A’ in the suit is for declaration that the said deed of agreement dated July 9, 2004 and the subsequent agreement dated March 3, 2005 executed between the plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 1 are subsisting and relief ‘B’ is to the effect that the plaintiff no. 1 is still a lessee in respect of the suit property on the basis of the subsisting lease agreement dated July 9, 2024.

5. Thus, it is argued that the defendant no. 2 was impleaded merely to obviate a reference to arbitration.

6. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant takes the court through the pleadings of the plaint and argues that no cause of action has been disclosed against the defendant no. 2 and as such, there cannot be any hindrance in the court referring the matter to arbitration.

7. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant further contends that the entire claim of the defendant no. 2, which was a successful bidder in a tender floated by the defendant no. 1 for the purpose of granting fresh lease, is through such tender and as such, through the defendant no. 1. Hence, as per the plaint pleadings, no independent right of the defendant no. 2 has been disclosed. Thus, since the defendant no. 2 claims through the defendant no. 1 for the purpose of the suit, the agreement containing the arbitration clause also binds the defendant no. 2.

8. At best, it is argued that the defendant no. 2 can have a cause of action against the defendant no. 1 in the event the work order issued in favour of defendant no. 2 is not fructified. However, the same cannot determine the outcome of the Section 8 application within the conspectus of the present suit, as framed.

9. Learned Senior Counsel next argues that although the original of the agreement was not filed with the Section 8 application, a copy duly certified by an officer of the defendant no. 1/appellant was filed with the same. That apart, it is argued that as the original agreement is already a part of the records in the suit and the existence of the same is admitted and relied on by the plaintiffs, there was no further necessity to produce the documents along with the Section 8 of application.

10. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant cites Ananthesh Bhakta represented by Mother Usha A. Bhakta and Ors. vs. Nayana S. Bhakta and Ors. , reported at (2017) 5 SCC 185 , where the Supreme Court, inter alia, held that the plaintiffs therein were admi