JUDGMENT :

SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. 

1. The writ application has been preferred against an order passed by appellate authority on 22.1.2025 wherein the appellate authority has been pleased to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation. The prayer for condonation of delay was not allowed by the appellate authority.

2. The relevant findings of the appellate authority is as follows:-

"It is observed that the appeal has arisen out of primary point of jurisdiction of the CA and against impugned order of the CA dtd.12.2.24 which was received by the appellant on 19.3.24. The appellant decided to apply for the certified copy on 14.06.24 and got it on 01.8.24 and filed the appeal on 01.8.24.

Perusing the above facts it is seen that the appellant has applied for the certified copy beyond the statutory period of 60 days i.e. 87 (eighty seven) days. Based on the contention of the appellant it appears that appellant rather than relying on the primary statutory limit of filing the appeal, has relied on the exceptional scenario assuming that it would be allowed further sixty days though such relaxation is not an automatic choice but depends upon the special circumstances and satisfaction of the appellate authority.

The appellant sides has also relied on the fact they were handicapped by the in ordinate delay to receive the certified copy.

It‘s a fact that appellant was not provided by certified copy before 01.08.24. But that does not justify the in ordinate delay on it‘s part to even show it‘s intention to appeal by applying for the certified copy of them impugned order of the CA within prescribed limit of 60 days.

To my opinion the relaxation provided under the first provision of sub section 7 of section 7 of the PG Act 1972 should only be exercised with caution and not as a general rule.

Otherwise the spirit of the PG Act 1972 which is an unique beneficial legislation would be defeated.

Thus I find no ground to condone the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant. The appeal is rejected. The appellant and OP are free to pursue their case on merit before the CA."

3. Learned counsel for the respondent/employee has vehemently opposed the prayer for setting aside of the order under appeal, on the ground that the appellate authority has rightly decided the point of limitation and on not condoning the said delay has rightly dismissed the appeal.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he has preferred the appeal within the period of 120 days (60+60) on showing sufficient cause before the appellate authority, who without proper application of mind has rejected the prayer of the petitioners and has dismissed the appeal on erroneous findings.

5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he is entitled to deduct the period during which the certified copy of the order was not made available to the petitioners to prefer the appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Agent, Kalipahiri Group of Mines, Eastern Coalfields Ltd. – vs- Union of India and others, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Cal 16999. Paragraph 16 is quoted below :-

“16. It will not be out of context to mention that the appellate authority being the creature of a statute is vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period as provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation of delay can be accepted is statutorily provided in this case, as 60 days with further period of 60 days upon condonation of delay as per sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Reliance may be placed in the decision of Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur reported in (2008) 3 SCC 70 and the relevant portions of the above decision is quoted below:-

“The commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are vested with jurisdiction to